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I. THE FIRST VÓRTTIKAS IN THE MAHÓBHÓ›YA 
 
1.  Introduction: The difficulty of identifying vårttikas 
 
 Academic disciplines, like other human institutions, have a tendency to become 
the guardians of their traditions. Indology is no exception. In the 19th century the 
pioneers of our field laid the foundations without which none of us would be able to 
carry out the work we are doing. What was done, by few people and with so few tools, 
is indeed impressive. What our 19th century predecessors did was to formulate theories 
sometimes based on little evidence. We cannot blame them for this. Without initial 
theories there is nothing to check, nothing to improve upon, and ultimately very little 
for Indologists to do. 
 The traditional tendency in our discipline has the unfortunate consequence that 
these initial theories have in many cases come to be looked upon as facts which one is 
not allowed to challenge unless one has very strong evidence. The formulation of other 
theories which are equally plausible, yet equally uncertain, is often looked upon as 
reproachable speculation. This is regrettable, for it may, and indeed does, lead to 
situations in which one scholar blames another for being speculative, while at the same 
time accepting without question theories propounded inthe 19th century. It should be 
clear that a theory formulated in the 19th century is not, for that reason, more 
acceptable than one formulated in the 20th. 
 This criticism against a prevailing tendency in Indology does not apply to all 
Indologists. Many are refreshingly open to other points of view. They demonstrate this 
in their work, and in their reactions to the work of colleagues. Yet it is still worthwhile 
to state explicitly and emphatically that much of what we do, and ought to do, is, with 
as much care as possible, to formulate and test theories. The theories we have to test are 
both old ones, which may date back to the 19th century or [2] even earlier, and new 
ones which we formulate ourselves. This applies also to what I am going to speak about 
today. We shall be comparing several competing theories as to which are the first 
vårttikas in the Mahåbhå∑ya, and then try to choose the most plausible one among them. 
 We start from the well-known theory that the Mahåbhå∑ya as we have it is not 
the work of one single author. The majority of scholars nowadays believe that most of 
the text was composed by someone called Patañjali. Embedded in the Mahåbhå∑ya are 
the so-called vårttikas, short nominal phrases as well as some verses, which where not 
composed by Patañjali. Most of the prose vårttikas are thought to have been formulated 
by someone called Kåtyåyana who, obviously, must have lived before Patañjali. 
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 It is not immediately obvious that the manuscripts and editions of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya contain the work of two, and possibly more, authors. Only in some 
exceptional cases is a vårttika explicitly ascribed to someone different from Patañjali. 
Indeed, there is reason to think that for many centuries no one was aware of the 
multiple authorship of the Mahåbhå∑ya. (Here and in what follows I will often use the 
term ‘Mahåbhå∑ya’ in order to refer to all that is contained in the manuscripts and 
editions, including the vårttikas.) Or they were aware of it but did not divide the text 
into vårttikas and Bhå∑ya in the same way as we do. Bhart®hari - perhaps the first 
commentator on the Mahåbhå∑ya and certainly the first one part of whose commentary 
has been preserved - appears to have ascribed different parts of the Mahåbhå∑ya proper 
to several authors. He certainly uses the word vårttika more than once to refer to 
passages from the Mahåbhå∑ya proper. Other authors may have followed the presumed 
example of the Mahåbhå∑ya when they called their work ‘Vårttika’, even though it 
contained both short nominal phrases (similar to Kåtyåyana's vårttikas) and explanatory 
prose. Some examples are the Tattvårthavårttika by the Jaina author Akala∫ka, and the 
Såµkhya work Yuktid¥pikå which is also known [3] by the name ‘Råjavårttika’. Other 
works again followed the style without adopting the name ‘Vårttika’. 
 It is not my intention to pursue these questions further at present. They have 
been dealt with in an article called "Vårttika" which will appear in the Wiener 
Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.1 I merely wish to draw your attention to the fact 
that the manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya do not indicate what is a vårttika and what is 
not. The later commentators on the Mahåbhå∑ya occasionally identify vårttikas, but not 
until Kielhorn an attempt was made to identify each and every vårttika in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya, and to establish a general criterion by which to identify them. 
 Kielhorn formulated this general criterion in a book which came out in 1876 and 
bore the title "Kåtyåyana and Patañjali: Their Relationship to Each Other, and to 
Påˆini". Briefly stated, Kielhorn recognizes as prose vårttikas those sentences which are 
accompanied by explanatory remarks, by a paraphrase which usually repeats the words 
of the vårttika. Kielhorn applied this criterion in his edition of the Mahåbhå∑ya, which 
has remained the standard edition of this text. The vårttikas are here printed in bold 
type, and are therefore easily distinguished from the text of the Mahåbhå∑ya proper. 
 By and large Kielhorn's criterion has been accepted by scholars in the field. 
Occasionally a question has been raised concerning the correct formulation of the 
criterion and its correct application in particular cases. This was perhaps most recently 
done by S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen (1981: 140-41 n. 452), with regard to P. 
                                                
1 The article has meanwhile appeared in WZKS 34 (1990), 123-146. 
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2.3.67 vt. 2 which, though explained by Patañjali, is explained with the help of different 
words. 
 Of perhaps more interest in this context is Kielhorn's habit of adding an 
explanation (which in these cases is identical with the vårttikas) where he thought that a 
certain phrase was a vårttika, thus staying in agreement with his own criterion. The 
vårttikas 8 to 15 on P. 1.1.21, for example, do not occur in any of [4] the manuscripts 
used by Kielhorn (I, p. 78, l. 8 f.; see note on p. 511). The vårttikas 5 to 7 on P. 1.1.58 
(I, p. 154, l. 12 f.) are similar; most manuscripts do not repeat them. A perusal of 
Kielhorn's critical notes reveals numerous cases whre vårttikas have been added against 
the evidence of the majority of manuscripts. In all these cases Kielhorn has himself 
created the evidence on which his criterion is based! Of course, Kielhorn has a theory to 
explain why many of his manuscripts do not treat presumed vårttikas as such: since the 
comment in the Bhå∑ya is in these cases identical with the vårttika, scribes did not 
bother to repeat this; they added a figure 2, in which place later a stop came, which in 
its turn disappeared altogether from many manuscripts.2 
 This example shows, I think, very clearly the way of working of one of our 
illustrious predecessors in the last century. Kielhorn did not just report what he found in 
his manuscripts. On the contrary, he formulated a theory about the authorship of the 
different parts of his text, and on the basis of this theory he subsequently felt entitled to 
go to the extent of deviating from his manuscripts in some cases. It would be beyond 
the scope of this lecture to discuss whether or not Kielhorn was right in doing so in 
each and every instance. Perhaps he was, perhaps he wasn't. But I will not in general 
terms argue with his method of trying to get beyond, or behind his texts by formulating 
theories which occasionally may even suggest readings which differ from those his 
manuscripts provided. 
 Nor is it my intention to argue, more in particular, with Kielhorn's criterion for 
identifying vårttikas. I accept that all phrases which are subsequently explained with the 
help of the same words are indeed vårttikas. I am not sure that all vårttikas underwent 
such treatment by Patañjali. This may or may not have been the case. This question is 
not however going to be [5] of much relevance for the specific problem which is going 
to be discussed in this lecture. 
 
                                                
2 See note 2 on pp. 12-13 of the Preface to the First Edition, Vol. II, in Vol. III of the Third Edition of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya. 
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2. The first vårttika according to tradition 
 
 The main question of this lecture is: Which is the first vårttika in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya? According to Kielhorn and several commentators on the Mahåbhå∑ya it 
is: 
 
siddhe ßabdårthasambandhe lokato 'rthaprayukte ßabdaprayoge ßåstreˆe 
dharmaniya-ma˙ yathå laukikavaidike∑u. 
 
It is discussed, in three parts, from p. 6 l. 12 to p. 9 l. 22 in volume I of Kielhorn's 
edition.3 
 The reason to think that this is the first vårttika lies in a passage in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya. The word siddha, it is argued, is here synonymous with nitya ‘eternal’. 
The question is then raised why the ambiguous term siddha is used rather than nitya. 
The answer is as follows (p. 6 l. 28 - p. 7 l. 2): 
 
ma∫galårtham/ må∫galika åcåryo mahata˙ ßåstraughasya ma∫galårthaµ 
siddhaßabdam ådita˙ prayu∫kte ma∫galåd¥ni hi ßåstråˆi prathante v¥rapuru∑akåˆi 
ca bhavanty åyu∑-matpuru∑akåˆi cådhyetåraß ca siddhårthå yathå syur iti/ 
 
For the sake of [having] something auspicious. The teacher, being intent on 
something auspicious, uses the word siddha at the beginning of the great stream 
in the form of the science [of grammar] in order [to have] something auspicious. 
For sciences which begin with something auspicious spread and are such that 
the men [who study them become] valiant and long-lived. [The use of siddha 
indicates:] ‘May those who study [this science] reach their aim (siddhårtha)’. 
[6] 
This passage seems to indicate that the vårttika siddhe ßabdårthasambandhe ... occurs at 
the beginning and must therefore be the first one. No commentator on the Mahåbhå∑ya 
has disputed this conclusion. Indeed, the vårttika is referred to as ‘the first vårttika’ by 
Íivaråmendra Sarasvat¥ (ådyaµ vårttikam; MPV I, p. 76 l. 2), while Någeßa 
emphatically states that all that precedes the vårttika derives from the author of the 
Bhå∑ya (ita˙ pËrvaµ tu ... bhå∑yakårasyaiva grantha iti bodhyam; NSP I, p. 55b, l. 10-
11). 
 
                                                
3 Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: ix) argue that this is not one vårttika but three. A discussion of their 
arguments and of their way of dividing the vårttika(s) is beyond the scope of this lecture. 
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3. Bhandarkar 's  objections 
 
 Objections against this position were raised more than a century ago by R.G. 
Bhandarkar (1876). Bhandarkar argued that before the vårttika siddhe 
ßabdårthasambandhe etc. there is at least one other vårttika in the Mahåbhå∑ya, viz. the 
sentence 
 
imåni prayojanåny adhyeyaµ vyåkaraˆam 
"These are the uses, grammar should be studied" (Mbh I, p. 5 l. 11) 
 
The reason for thinking that this is one of Kåtyåyana's vårttikas is that this sentence is 
followed by iti and preceded by the words 
 
åcårya˙ suh®d bhËtvå anvåca∑†e 
 
This expression, Bhandarkar maintained, "occurs in several places of the Mahåbhåshya, 
in all of which we have to understand Kåtyåyana by the term åcårya" (p. 345). 
Moreover, "in all these instances the sentence indicated by iti, which stands in the place 
of an object to the verb anvåca∑†e, is a vårtika, for it is explained just before by 
Patanjali, as all vårtikas are" (p. 346). 
 
4.  Weaknesses of Bhandarkar 's  arguments 
 
 This last remark shows immediately why Bhandarkar's alleged vårttika could 
not be acceptable to Kielhorn. Kielhorn's criterion is that a vårttika is followed by an 
explanation. The sen-[7]tence imåni prayojanåny adhyeyaµ vyåkaraˆam, on the other 
hand, is preceded by an explanation. 
 Bhandarkar's other argument, too, shows some weaknesses which can easily be 
brought to light with the help of the better tools which we now possess in the form of a 
good edition of the Mahåbhå∑ya (by Kielhorn) and of a Word Index (by Pathak and 
Chitrao). To begin with, most of the manuscripts on which Kielhorn based his edition 
do not have the words suh®d bhËtvå in the passage under consideration. This does not 
necessarily mean that they are a later addition.4 The later tradition believed that there 
could be no vårttika on these early pages of the Mahåbhå∑ya, and this fact may have 
induced too observant scribes to droop the words that would prove the opposite. One 
might argue that suh®d bhËtvå was added only because all other occurrences of the two 
                                                
4 Bhart®hari's commentary offers no help in determining the presence or absence of these words. 
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words åcårya˙ anvåca∑†e, with only one exception,5 are accompanied by the phrase 
suh®d bhËtvå; but this argument is not very strong. If a scribe was knowledgeable 
enough to remember the usual co-occurrence of åcåryå˙ anvåca∑†e and suh®d bhËtvå, he 
should also remember that suh®d bhËtvå comes always after åcårya˙ and before 
anvåca∑†e. In our passage, on the other hand, the order is: suh®d bhËtvå ''cårya (idaµ 
ßåstram) anvåca∑†e. Yet the absence of these words in many manuscripts somewhat 
weakens the main thrust of Bhandarkar's argument. 
 Bhandarkar also overlooked one passage (Mbh I, p. 208, l. 16, on P. 1.2.32) 
where the expression tad åcårya˙ suh®d bhËtvå 'nvåca∑†e [8] obviously refers to Påˆini. 
The sËtra under discussion her is P. 1.2.32 tasyådita udåttam ardhahrasvam, which 
describes the correct pronunciation of the svarita accent. Patañjali observes that without 
this sËtra one would not know how much of the svarita is udåtta, and how much 
anudåtta. The Bhå∑ya then continues: 
 
tad åcårya˙ suh®d bhËtvå 'nvåca∑†a iyad udåttam iyad anudåttam ... 
Therefore the Ócårya, out of friendliness, explains ‘This much is udåtta, this 
much anudåtta’ ... 
 
The Ócårya here can only be Påˆini. However, the sentence imåni prayojanåny 
adhyeyaµ vyåkaraˆam certainly does not derive from Påˆini, so that Bhandarkar's 
argument is not necessarily weakened much by this fact. 
 In spite of the weaknesses in Bhandarkar's arguments we cannot easily discard 
them altogether. Whether or not the words suh®d bhËtvå origianlly occurred in the 
sentence which introduces the presumed first vårttika, all manuscripts agree that the 
word åcårya belongs there. This word åcårya usually refers to Påˆini, sometimes to 
Kåtyåyana or someone else, but never, except supposedly here, to Patañjali himself. 
This is the conclusion reached by Kielhorn (1876: 249 (177) f.) after studying sixty 
occurrences of the word åcårya. This fact is puzzling, and it seems clear that 
Bhandarkar's case deserves further consideration. 
 
                                                
5 The exception is Mbh. IIIp. 349 l. 4 (on P. 7.4.24 vt. 1). With suh®d bhËtvå the words occur Mbh. I p. 
208 l. 16 (on P. 1.2.32), p. 315 l. 2 (on P. 1.4.3 vt 6), p. 368 l. 2 (on P. 2.1.1 vt. 12), p. 481 l. 3 (on P. 
2.4.32 vt. 2); II p. 157 l. 7 (on P. 3.3.127 vt. 2), p. 162 l. 20-21 (on P. 3.3.137 vt. 2), p. 163 l. 12 (on P. 
3.3.141 vt. 1), p. 303 l. 15 (on P. 4.3.4 vt. 2), p. 325 l. 7 (on P. 4.3.143 vt. 2), p. 349 l. 15 (on P. 5.1.30-31 
vt. 1), p. 359 l. 22 (on P. 5.1.84 vt. 1), p. 406 l. 18 (on P. 5.3.20 vt. 1), p. 409 l. 20 (on P. 5.3.35 vt. 1). 
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5. Bhandarkar 's  position modified.  
 
 There is one more flaw in Bhandarkar's arguments, which, surprisingly, does not 
further weaken his case but rather strengthens it, be it in a somewhat modified form. 
We saw that, according to Bhandarkar, the sentence indicated by iti and following the 
expression åcårya˙ suh®d bhËtvå 'nvåca∑†e is always a vårttika. This is not completely 
correct. It is rather Patañjali's paraphrase of a vårttika, not the vårttika itself, which is 
introduced by this expression. Sometimes Patañjali's paraphrase is a simple [9] 
repetition of the vårttika,6 But in other cases it is not. The following cases illustrate this: 
 
(i) P. 1.4.3 vt. 6 reads: hrasveyuvsthånaprav®ttau ca str¥vacane. Patañjali 
paraphrases this as follows: hrasvau ceyuvsthånau ca prav®ttau ca pråk ca 
prav®tte˙ str¥vacanåv eva nad¥saµjñau bhavata iti vaktavyam. This paraphrase 
reappears in the final sentence of Patañjali's discussion  (p. 315, l. 2-3): tad 
åcårya˙ suh®d bhËtvå 'nvåca∑†e hrasvau ceyuvsthånau ca prav®ttau ca pråk ca 
prav®tte˙ str¥vacanåv eveti. 
(ii) P. 2.4.32 vt. 2 reads: anvådeßaß ca kathitånukathanamåtram. It is 
paraphrased: anvådeßaß ca kathitånukathanamåtraµ dra∑†avyam. This 
paraphrase occurs again in the next line (p. 481, l. 3-4): tad åcårya˙ suh®d 
bhËtvå 'nvåca∑†e 'nvådeßaß ca kathitånukathanamåtraµ dra∑†avyam iti. 
 
These cases make clear that the sentence imåni prayojanåny adhyeyaµ vyåkaraˆam 
must be considered a paraphrase rather than a vårttika. 
 But what is paraphrased? Quite clearly the section of the Mahåbhå∑ya that deals 
with the uses of grammar, i.e., p. 1, l. 14 - p. 5, l. 4 in Kielhorn's edition. This long 
section contains two headings which might easily be looked upon as vårttikas. Both 
contain features that indicate that they were not written by the author of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya. We shall look at them one by one: 
 
(i) p. 1,.l.14: kåni puna˙ ßabdånußåsanasya prayojanåni/ 
rak∑ohågamalghvasandehå˙ prayojanam/ 
 
                                                
6 E.g., P. 3.3.127 vt. 2 is repeated at Mbh II, p. 157, l. 7; P. 3.3.141 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 163, l. 12-13; P. 
4.3.143 vt. 2 at Mbh II, p. 324, l. 7; P. 5.1.31 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 349, l. 15; P. 5.1.84 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 
359, l. 22; P. 5.3.20 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 406, l. 18; P. 5.3.35 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 409, l. 20. 
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This is the less peculiar of the two headings. Yet it is remarkable in that the gramatical 
number of the word prayojana differs in [10] question and answer.7 This does suggest 
that the form of the answer was fixed, in other words, that the answer is a quotation 
from an earlier work. 
 
(ii) p. 2, l. 3-6: imåni ca bhËya˙ ßabdånußåsanasya prayojanåni/ te 'surå˙/ di∑†a˙ 
ßabda˙/ yad adh¥tam/ yas tu prayu∫kte/ avidvåµsa˙/ vibhaktiµ kurvanti/ yo vå 
imåm/ catvåri/ uta tva˙/ saktum iva/ sårasvat¥m/ daßamyåµ putrasya/ sudevo asi 
varuˆeti/ 
 
Patañjali does not know the precise significance of all the items ofthis list. This proves 
that he did not make it himself.8 Each of the items is the beginning of a quotation, 
ususally from Vedic literature. In some cases Patañjali does not know which quotation 
is intended: 
 
(ii-a) In the case of catvåri Patañjali gives two quotations from the Ùgveda 
beginning with that word, introducing the second one with the phrase apara åha 
"someone else says". The first quotation is RV 4.58.3, which begins catvåri 
ß®∫gå trayo asya pådå ... The other quotation is RV 1.164.45: catvåri 
våkparimitå padåni ... 
(ii-b) Patañjali does not know the full form of the quotation beginning with 
daßamyåµ putrasya. Instead he cites a text which begins daßamyuttarakålaµ 
putrasya jåtasya nåma vidadhyåd ... 
(ii-c) The prat¥ka vibhaktiµ kurvanti does not recur inthe quoted line prayåjå˙ 
savibhaktikå˙ kåryå˙. 
 
 Note that both the headings are treated like vårttika in Kielhorn's sens in that 
they are explained in full detail in the immediately following Bhå∑ya. It is therefore not 
surprising that [11] at least one author explicitly calls the first of these two a vårttika. 
Såyaˆa, in his introduction to his commentary on the Ùgveda, makes the following 
remark (p. 26, l. 28-30): 
 
                                                
7 So also Filliozat, 1975: 27 fn. 3. Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: 26 fn. 72), following K. Ch. Chatterji, 
point out that "the use of the sg. prayojanam is typical of Kåtyåyanavårttikas ..., whereas Patañjali 
commonly uses the pl." 
8 So Filliozat, 1975: 38 fn. 1. 
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tasyaitasya vyåkaraˆasya prayojanaviße∑o vararucinå vårttike darßita˙ 
‘rak∑ohågamalaghvasandehå˙ prayojanam’ iti/ etåni rak∑ådiprayojanåni 
prayojanåntaråˆi ca mahåbhå∑ye patañjalinå spa∑†¥k®tåni/ 
 
And in his commentary on the Taittir¥ya Saµhitå (1.1.1) he ascribes the quoted line to 
Kåtyåyana (p. 32, l. 20-21): 
 
kåtyåyano 'pi vyåkaraˆaprayojanåny udåjahåra ‘rak∑ohågamalaghvasandehå˙ 
prayojanam’ iti/ 
 
These considerations show that Bhandarkar's arguments, if suitably adjusted, are 
stronger than Bhandarkar himself may have suspected. There is good reason to think 
that at least two vårttikas preceded the ‘first vårttika’, viz. (1) 
rak∑ohågamalaghvasandehå˙ prayojanam, and (2) te 'surå˙/ .../ sudevo asi varuˆeti/. 
These two vårttikas fulfil Kielhorn's criterion of being subsequently explained by 
Patañjali. Moreover, they are ascribed to an Ócårya by Patañjali himself, which shows 
that he cannot have been their author. But once we have accepted these two (or do they 
together count as one?) new vårttikas as authentic, there is no reason not to follow 
Bhandarkar in thinking that also the very first line of the Mahåbhå∑ya, atha 
ßabdånußåsanam, is a vårttika. This line, too, is explained by Patañjali, and must be 
considered to fulfil Kielhorn's criterion. 
 
6.  Traditional argument rejected.  
 
 A major problem remains however. How can we accept three new vårttikas in 
the very beginning of the Mahåbhå∑ya when Patañjali explicitly states that the vårttika 
siddhe ßabdårthasambandhe etc. is at the beginning? 
 The answer given by Bhandarkar is "that these aphorisms are simply 
introductory, while the regular ßåstra begins with siddhe ßabdårtha... etc. The provision 
for ma∫gala is therefore [12] made in this, and not in the preceding ones, just as Påˆini 
secures ma∫gala in the first of his regular sËtras, viz. v®ddhir ådaic, and not in the 
pratyåhåra sËtras" (p. 346). Here again Bhandarkar's argument can be strengthened 
further. 
 In three places of the Mahåbhå∑ya Patañjali invokes the idea of ma∫gala 
‘something auspicious’. The first time is in connection with the ‘first vårttika’ which we 
studied above; the second time in order to explain the presence of the word v®ddhi at 
the beginning of the first sËtra of the A∑†ådhyåy¥ (I, p. 40, l. 6-9). On both of these 
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occasions only "sciences which begin with something auspicious" (ma∫galåd¥ni 
ßåstråˆi) are mentioned. On the third occasion (Mbh I, p. 253, l. 5-7), however, 
"sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the 
end" are mentioned. Here the context is the inexplicable presence of non-modified bhË 
in P. 1.3.1 bhËvådayo dhåtava˙. It is explained as "something auspicious in the 
middle", a not very accurate characterization in view of the fact that P. 1.3.1 occurs 
nowhere near the middle of the A∑†ådhyåy¥ with its eight books. Even more interesting 
is that Patañjali here describes the A∑†ådhyåy¥ as "having something auspicious in the 
end". The commentator Jinendrabuddhi on the Kåßikå on this sËtra 1.3.1 specifies that 
udaya in P. 8.4.67 is the ma∫gala in the end, but the fact is that P. 8.4.67 is not the last 
sËtra of the A∑†ådhyåy¥, not even in Patañjali's view. We cannot but conclude that 
Patañjali should not be taken too seriously in this regard. 
 
7.  Conclusion. 
 
 We see that Bhandarkar's position can be modified and strengthened so as to 
lead to the following result. The first vårttikas in the Mahåbhå∑ya are: 
 
1. atha ßabdånußasanam 
2. rak∑ohågamalaghvasandehå˙ prayojanam 
3. te 'surå˙ etc. 
4. siddhe ßabdårthasambandhe etc. 
[13] 
This list of vårttikas differs from Bhandarkar's in accepting 
rak∑ohågamalaghvasandehå˙ prayojanam and te 'surå˙ etc. as vårttikas, while not 
accepting Bhandarkar's imåni prayojanåni adhyeyaµ vyåkaraˆam. 
 I have not yet mentioned, in the course of this lecture, the list of initial vårttikas 
proposed by S. D. Joshi in his article on Bhandarkar and Sanskrit Grammar (1976: 
124). Joshi briefly recapitulates Bhandarkar's arguments, then ends up with the 
following list of intial vårttikas: 
 
1. atha ßabdånußasanam 
2. laukikånåµ vaidikånåm ca 
3. rak∑ohågamalaghvasandehå˙ prayojanam 
4. imåni prayojanåni, adhyeyaµ vyåkaraˆam 
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Joshi does not in this article reject Bhandarkar's imåni prayojanåni, adhyeyaµ 
vyåkaraˆam; nor does he recognize te 'surå˙ etc. as a vårttika. In their recent translation 
of the Paspaßåhnika, on the other hand, Joshi and Roodbergen (1986) accept only the 
following two lines as vårttikas: 
 
1. atha ßabdånußasanam 
2. rak∑ohågamalaghvasandehå˙ prayojanam 
 
Unfortunately neither of the two positions is sufficiently argued by Joshi (and 
Roodbergen). Let us hope that the present lecture has now placed the discussion 
regarding the first vårttikas in the Mahåbhå∑ya on a firmer footing. 




II. THE TEXT HISTORY OF THE MAHÓBHÓ›YA 
 
1.  One archetype underlying all manuscripts.  
 
 The standard edition of the Mahåbhå∑ya is the one published by Kielhorn about 
a century ago and reedited several times in the intervening period. Kielhorn's edition is 
based on a number of manuscripts which occasionally differ from each other in minor 
points, but on the whole show remarkable agreement.9 This agreement induced 
Kielhorn to state in an article: "According to my own view no evidence has yet been 
adduced to prove that the text of the Mahåbhå∑ya as known to us from the MSS. is not 
the original text of that work, and the only one that ever existed".10 In the preface to the 
first volume of his edition, after describing the manuscripts used, Kielhorn observes: 
"Generally speaking, the text of the Mahåbhå∑ya is the same in all the above MSS., and 
the differences in reading which occur are not such as to prove the existence of two or 
more recensions of the work. Though numerous, they rarely affect the meaning of a 
passage, and they are in the majority of cases accounted for by the carelessness of 
individual copyists, or the desire of a student to improve on the text which he was 
studying".11 







        extant manuscripts 
All the manuscripts used for the edition of the Mahåbhå∑ya go back to a common 
archetype which, in Kielhorn's opinion, is the original text written by Patañjali. 
 
                                                
9 It may here be recalled that the critical apparatus of the third volume of Kielhorn's edition is missing in 
all printed editions. 
10 Kielhorn, 1876a: 242 (170). 
11 Kielhorn, 1880-85: I: 10. 
archetype
e 
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2. Archetype not identical with Patañjali 's  text.  
 
There is evidence which shows that this scheme has to be adjusted. This has been 
pointed out by V. P. Limaye in his Critical Studies on the Mahåbhå∑ya (1974), and 
more recently, and more exhaustively, by Wilhelm Rau in his book Die vedischen 
Zitate im Vyåkaraˆa-Mahåbhå∑ya (1985). Limaye and Rau found that many Vedic 
quotations appeared in a corrupted form in all the manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya used 
by Kielhorn. We find, for example, in the Bhå∑ya on P. 5.1.119 vt. 9 the following 
quoted line (Mbh II, p. 368, l. 19): 
 
nirv¥ryatåµ vai yajamåna (one Ms. has jayamåna) åßåste apaßutåm gau˙ (some 
Mss. drop gau˙) 
 
This occurs at MS 2.18 (p. 10, l. 4) in the form 
 
nirv¥ryatåµ vai puru∑o yamo jåta åßåste 'paßutåµ gau˙ 
 
and must have been the original reading also in the Mahåbhå∑ya. Another example is 
the quotation 
 
ßiro me ß¥ryate mukhe 
 
in all the manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 6.1.60 vt. 2. [16] The correct reading is 
 
ßiro me ßr¥r yaßo mukham 
 
and is found at MS 3.11.8 (p. 151, l. 16), KS 38.4 (p. 105, l. 4), VS 20.5 and TB 
2.6.5.3-4. Further examples are discussed on pp. 98 to 101 of Rau's book. 
 Rau further draws attention to the fact that in a number of cases words in Vedic 
quotations appear to have been forgotten by the scribe, then added in the margin, and 
subsequently reintroduced by a later scribe in the wrong place. Of the three instances 
given by Rau I shall reproduce one. The Bhå∑ya on P. 5.4.30 vt. 5 has 
 
kavyo 'si havyasËdana/ kavir asi/ raudreˆån¥kena ... 
 
MS 1.2.12 (p. 21, l. 16 f.) and KS 2.13 (p. 17, l. 17-18) have 
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kavyo 'si kavyavåhano raudreˆån¥kena ... 
 
This passage gives the correct position of raudreˆån¥kena. In the Mahåbhå∑ya it is 
misplaced in all the manuscripts. 
 What can we conclude from all this? It seems obvious that all the manuscripts 
used by Kielhorn for his edition derive from a common archetype. This archetype, 
however, was not identical with Patañjali's original text. It rather was a manuscript 
which itself stood at the end of a tradition, and into which in the course of the 
transmission certain mistakes had crept. It is more than likely that this manuscript dated 
from a time well after Patañjali. All the other manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya which 
may have existed simultaneously with this archetype manuscript, perhaps elsewhere in 
India, did not give rise to copies which survived to our time. Our scheme must therefore 
be modified in the following manner: 
[17] 




3.  The archetype. 
 
 An attempt to discover the date and place of the archetype of the Mahåbhå∑ya 
has recently been made by M. Witzel (1986). His method is as follows. Certain 
mistakes in Vedic quotations are most easily explained when we take into account that 
the manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya have been written in different scripts in the course 
of time. Some letters, or combinations of letters, may be very similar to other letters in 
one type of script, but not in another. Witzel has recognized some of the mistakes as 
having most probably been made in certain identifiable scripts. He comes to the 
conclusion that "some of the mistakes reported in Rau's monograph (i.e., Rau's book on 
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the Vedic quotation in the Mahåbhå∑ya) ... tend to have occurred in one of the Northern 
post Gupta scripts" (p. 249). "A number of them", [18] he continues (p. 251), "are only 
possible after the development of early Någar¥". The similarity of bh and y, for example 
is found only in northern scripts, and confusion between the two is most probable after 
the development of early Någar¥. It has taken place in the following quotation in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 4.1.85 vt. 6: 
 
båh¥kam astu bhadraµ va˙ 
 
This is a corrupted version of AV(P) 9.7.5 
 
båh¥kam astu yad rapa˙ 
 
Confusion between m and bh is only possible after ca. 1000 C.E. in northern Någar¥ 
scripts. It is exemplified in the quotation 
 
stobhair janayåmi navyam 
 
in the Bhå∑ya on P. 3.4.30 vt. 5. The correct reading must be 
 
stomaµ janayåmi navyam 
 
which occurs in several Vedic texts, among them RV 1.109.2. 
 The change from ca to i, finally, which is possible only in northern and western 
Någar¥, has taken place in 
 
mådbhir i∑†vå indro v®trahå 
 
quoted under P. 7.4.48 vt. 1. Here indro stands for candro, as is clear from AV 19.27.2 
and AV(P) 10.7.2. 
 These and other arguments point to a time of about 1000 C.E. for the archetype 
(p. 252). Its probable homeland could be Benares, Nepal, or Gujarat; from among these 
Witzel prefers a western origin (p. 251). 
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4. Våkyapad¥ya 2.485. 
 
 There is another period in the text history of the Mahåbhå∑ya where something 
similar would seem to have taken place. Witzel refers to it, but many others before him 
have dealt with the final verses of the second Kåˆ∂a of the Våkyapad¥ya in this [19] 
connection.12 According to these verses the tradition of the Mahåbhå∑ya had been 
neglected, but was revived by some scholars, among them an Ócårya named Candra. 
This much seems clear; once we try to derive more precise information from these 
verses, difficulties of interpretation arise. 
 The most important verse of the passage is VP 2.485 (in the numbering of Rau's 
edition). Goldstücker (1960: 258) translated: 
 
That grammatical document [or manuscript of the Mahåbhå∑ya], which was 
obtaine from the pupils of Patañjali, then remained for some time preserved in 
one copy only amongst the inhabitants of the Dekhan.13 
 
There can be no doubt that if Goldstücker's translation is acceptable, the verse 
concerned is of great interest in the present context. In that case it seems clear that there 
wa a second occasion where one manuscript of the Mahåbhå∑ya came to replace all the 
others. This would have taken place in the period preceding Bhart®hari, and the 
manuscript would be the one presumably found by Ócårya Candra. 
 Goldstücker's interpretation was accepted by Albrecht Weber, who translated 
(1862: 161): 
 
Der den Schülern Patañjali's entfallene Grammatik-Text 'ne Weil bei den 
Dåkshiˆåtya in einer Handschrift nur bestand.14 
 
Weber went further and expressed the view that the text of the Mahåbhå∑ya had been 
devastated and newly arranged, "so that the possibility of considerable alterations, 
additions, and inter-[20]polations cannot be denied, and that in every case it remains a 
priori uncertain whether a particular example belongs to Patañjali, or is owing only to 
later reconstructions."15 
                                                
12 The literature is given in Bronkhorst, 1983: 406 n. 25. To this list must be added Laddu, 1982, and 
Aklujkar, 1991. 
13 The reading translated by Goldstücker is: ya˙ påtañjalißi∑yebhyo a∑†o vyåkaraˆågama˙ [ya˙ 
patañjalißi∑yebhyo 'bhya∑†o ...]/ kålena dåk∑iˆåtye∑u graµthamåtre [grantha-] vyavasthita˙/ 
14 Weber read the verse: ya˙ patañjjalißi∑yebhyo vyåkaraˆågama˙/ kålena dåk∑iˆåtye∑u granthamåtre 
vyavasthita˙// 
15 Weber, 1876: 242 n. 238, as translated in Kielhorn, 1876a: 242. See further Weber, 1873: 320. 
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 This is not the place to deal in extenso with Weber's ideas regarding the 
presumed "alterations, additions, and interpolations" in the Mahåbhå∑ya. Bhart®hari's 
verses do not have to be interpreted in this way, and Weber's supporting evidence is 
largely derived from the Råjatara∫giˆ¥, a text so much later that it seems wiser to leave 
it out of consideration altogether. Solid supporting evidence is completely lacking. 
 In recent years Weber's position has been revived by S. D. Joshi. Joshi translates 
VP 2.485 as follows (1976: 138): 
 
The grammatical tradition which had slipped away from the pupils of Patañjali 
was preserved in the course of time merely in boks among the inhabitants of the 
South.16 
 
Joshi too is attracted by the supposition "that Candra etc. added to the original Bhå∑ya 
... and added from a variety of sources, not necesarily grammatical". Here too we may 
feel doubtful as long as no more solid evidence is presented. But it seems clear that 
Joshi too derives from verse 485 the conclusion that, if not one single copy of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya had been preserved, in any case they were few in number, few enough for 
Candra to be able to change the text of the Mahåbhå∑ya effectively. 
 The opinions of Goldstücker, Weber and Joshi have been seriously criticised in 
the course of time, most notably by Bhandarkar (1873), Kielhorn (1876a) and Cardona 
(1978). Yet these criticisms may not contain any solid reason to abandon the thought 
that the Mahåbhå∑ya had been preserved in but one, or a few, manuscripts before the 
time of Bhart®hari. The evidence [21] so far considered allows us to think that all later 
manuscripts ultimately derive from the manuscript constituted by Ócårya Candra or one 
of his colleagues on the basis of the manuscript or manuscripts he found in the South. 
 
5.  VP 2.485 needs to be interpreted differently.  
 
 In spite of this I am of the opinion that this position is not correct. In an article 
entitled "On the history of Påˆinian grammar in the early centuries following Patañjali" 
(1983) I have collected evidence which shows that the Mahåbhå∑ya was widely studied 
in the period before Bhart®hari and before the grammarian Candragomin - who may 
have been identical with the mysterious Candra referred to in the Våkyapad¥ya. In this 
period changes were made in the Dhåtupå†ha, SËtrapå†ha and Gaˆapå†ha of Påˆini's 
grammar, and i∑†is and upasaµkhyånas were added in the commentaries. Many of these 
                                                
16 Joshi accepts the reading: ya˙ patañjalißi∑yebhyo bhra∑†o vyåkaraˆågama˙/ kåle sa dåk∑iˆåtye∑u 
granthamåtre vyavasthita˙// 
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changes were made under the influence of the Mahåbhå∑ya. This makes it hard to 
believe that there were only a few manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya, all of them in one 
place, and rather suggests that these manuscripts were present in sufficient numbers all 
over India, or at least in several parts of India. 
 
6.  Variant readings recorded in the Mahåbhå∑ya-D¥pikå.  
 
 There is however more direct evidence pertaining to the fate of the Mahåbhå∑ya 
in that period. Bhart®hari's commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya, commonly referred to as 
Mahåbhå∑ya-D¥pikå or simply D¥pikå, records a number of variant readings in the text 
of the Mahåbhå∑ya, i.e., in the first seven Óhnikas on which the surviving part of the 
D¥pikå comments.17 
 (i) Mbh I, p. 2, l. 19 quotes the verse yas tu prayu∫kte kußalo viße∑e ... 
Bhart®hari (Ms 4b9-c4; Sw 13.10-24; AL 11.7-14) initially discusses the reading kußalo 
viße∑e also considering [22] the interpretation kußalo 'viße∑e, i.e., aviße∑e, and then 
continues: anye∑åµ grantha˙ kußalo viße∑air iti. None of Kielhorn's manuscripts has this 
reading. 
 (ii) Mbh I, p. 5, l. 6 has om ity uktvå v®ttåntaßa˙ ßami tyevamåd¥ñ ßabdån 
pa†hanti. Bhart®hari (Ms 5c2-3; Sw 18.13-15; AL 14.23-24) knows both the readings 
v®ttåntata˙ and v®ttåntaßa˙: v®ttåntata iti/ .../ tatrådyåditvåt tasi˙/ .../ anye∑åµ v®ttåntaßa 
iti på†ha˙/. Kielhorn's manuscripts have only v®ttåntaßa˙. 
 (iii) Mbh I, p. 28, l. 18 (on ÍivasËtra 5 vt. 5) reads yad ayuktå vahanty 
anupadi∑†åß ca ßrËyante. Bhart®hari (Ms 25d6-7 and 11; Sw 94.1 and 95.1; AL 81.5-6 
and 11-12) knows this reading as well as the variant yad ayuktå vahanty anupadi∑†å˙ 
ßrËyante. Kaiya†a remarks (I, p. 89): kvacit tu caßabdo na pa†hyate. This reading is 
unknown to Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
 (iv) Mbh I, p. 30, l. 11-12 (on ÍivasËtra 5 vt. 10) has ... ya˙ kËpe kËpårtha˙ sa 
kakårasya ... Bhart®hari (Ms 26d8-9; Sw 97.24-28; AL 83.22-84.3) ascribes this reading 
to ‘some’, and to ‘others’ the same with the last word replaced by sakakårasya, or so it 
seems. It is also possible that the ‘others’ had the same reading but joined sa and 
kakårasya into a single compound.18 
 (v) Mbh I, p. 55, l. 16 (on P. 1.1.5 vt. 5) reads aparyåptaß caiva hi yåsu† 
samudåyasya ∫ittve ∫itaµ cainaµ karoti. Bhart®hari knows two readings (Ms 41d8 and 
41d12-42a1; Sw 146.11 and 21; AL 125.9 and 17): the first is aparyåptaß caiva yåsu† 
samudåyasya ∫ittve, which corresponds almost completely with Kielhorn's edition; the 
                                                
17 A number of these were already enumerated by Kielhorn in the Preface to the First Edition, Vol. II, of 
his edition of the Mahåbhå∑ya; see Kielhorn, 1880-1885: III: 23 f. 
18 The text reads: anye∑åµ grantha˙ sakakårasya, which is of course ambiguous. 
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second appears to be corrupt in the manuscript19 but may have to be reconstructed in the 
light of a remark by Kaiya†a into suparyåptaß caiva hi yåsu† samudåyasya ∫ittve. 
Kaiya†a's remark is (I, p. 141): ke∑åµcit på†ha˙ suparyåptaß caiva hi iti. This reading 
does not occur in any of Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
[23] 
 (vi) P. 1.1.6 vt. 2 d¥dhyad iti ßyan vyatyayena (Mbh I, p. 56, l. 9) has at least one 
variant reading according to Bhart®hari (Ms 42b11-c1; Sw 149.1 and 5; AL 127.10-11 
and 13-14), viz. ßap vyatyayena and perhaps another one. Kaiya†a (I, p. 142) records the 
variant reading ßo vyatyayena. Unknown to Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
 (vii) Mbh I, p. 56, l. 18 (on P. 1.1.7) avidyamånam antaram e∑åm iti occurs in 
two forms in Bhart®hari's commentary (Ms 42d4 and 6; Sw 150.13 and 18; AL 128.18 
and 21): avidyamånam antaraµ ye∑åm and avidyamånam antare (?) ye∑åm. No second 
reading is known to Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
 (viii) Mbh I, p. 60, l. 6-7 (on P. 1.1.8) has nåsikåvacano 'nunåsika it¥ty 
ucyamåne yamånusvåråˆåm eva prasajyeta. Bhart®hari (Ms 45d12-46a1; Sw 162.26-27; 
AL 140.22-23) knows both the readings yamånusvåråˆåm and yamånusvåråˆåm api. 
Unknown to Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
 (ix) Mbh I, p. 66, l. 3 (on P. 1.1.11) has udåttånudåttasvaritånåm. Bhart®hari (Ms 
50d7-8; AL 156.1-2; CE V.1.21) quotes this (repeating anudåtta- twice), then adds: 
anu[nå]sikagrahaˆam apy anye∑åµ vidyate. Kaiya†a states, similarly (I, p. 163): kvacid 
anunåsikagrahaˆam apy asti. This reading is not known to Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
 (x) Mbh I, p. 67, l. 23-24 (on P. 1.1.11 vt. 5) has atra h¥dådi dvivacanaµ 
tadantaµ ca bhavati pratyayalak∑aˆena. Bhart®hari records two readings (Ms 54d3-5; 
AL 165.11-14; CE V.9.19-22): tatra hi ¥dådi ca dvivacanaµ tadantaµ ca bhavati 
pratyayalak∑aˆena as well as atra hi ¥dådyantaµ ßrËyate dvivacanåntaµ ca bhavati 
pratyayalak∑aˆena. Kaiya†a records the variant reading ¥dådyantaµ ca ßrËyate (I, p. 
167). Unknown to Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
 (xi) P. 1.1.17-18 vt. 2 together with the Bhå∑ya introducting and following it 
read (Mbh I, p. 72, l. 10-13): kimartho yogavibhåga˙/ Ë vå ßåkalyasya (vt. 2)/ 
ßåkalyasyåcåryasya matena Ë vibhå∑å yathå syåt/ Ë iti u iti/ anye∑åm åcåryåˆåµ matena 
v iti/. [24] All this is missing in Bhart®hari's commentary. Surprisingly, Bhart®hari only 
knows the reading kimartho yogavibhåga˙ ßåkalyavibhå∑å må bhËt (Ms 58c9; AL 
176.7-8; CE V.18.5), which he apparently did not find in all his manuscripts, and which 
presents great problems of interpretation (see CE V Notes p. 121). No trace of this 
Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
                                                
19 Cf. AL 125 fn. 7. 
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 (xii) Mbh I, p. 93, l. 8 (on P. 1.1.35) has jñåtidhanaparyåyavåc¥. According to 
others, Bhart®hari tels us (Ms 73d5-6; AL 219.2-3; CE VI.30.26), the reading is 
ajñåtidhanaparyåyavåc¥. Kielhorn's manuscripts do not know this reading. 
 (xiii) Mbh I, p. 112, l. 16 (on P. 1.1.45 vt. 3) has tasyåsådhvabhimatasya. 
Bhart®hari (Ms 95a5-6; AL 273.14) may know this reading, besides sådhvabhimatasya, 
if Abhyankar and Limaye were right in reconstructing: tatra sådhvabhimatasyeti 
grantha˙/ ta evaµ varˆayanti sådhËnåm abhimatasyeti/. Unknown to Kielhorn's 
manuscripts. 
 (xiv) Mbh I, p. 112, l. 6 (on P. 1.1.50 vt. 2) has kvacid vairËpyam. Bhart®hari 
(Ms 104c3-4; AL 298.19, 24-25) knows the alternative reading dvairËpyam. Kielhorn's 
manuscripts don't. 
 (xv) Bhart®hari (Ms 105c10; AL 301.23) informs us that ‘some’ read the line u˙ 
sthåne 'ˆ eva bhavati raparaß ca ...(Mbh I, p. 125, l. 17, on P. 1.1.51; repeated p. 126, l. 
5, under vt. 2) without eva. Kaiya†a, too, knows both readings, with and without eva (I, 
p. 275); none of Kielhorn's manuscripts does. 
 (xvi) Mbh I, p. 129, l. 5 kalpipadasaµghåtabhakto 'sau ... (on P. 1.1.51 vt. 9) is 
known in two forms to Bhart®hari (Ms 107c6; AL 307.15-16). The alternative reading 
seems to be kalpipadasaµghåtabhakto 'yam, although Kaiya†a (I, p. 282) records the 
variant kalpapadasaµghåta-. No variant in Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
 (xvii) Mbh I, p. 130, l. 4 (on P. 1.1.52) has kim idam algrahaˆam 
antyaviße∑aˆam åhosvid ådeßaviße∑aˆam. Bhart®hari [25] (Ms 108b9; AL 309.8) records 
the alternative reading kim idam algrahaˆam antyaviße∑aˆam/ evaµ bhavitum arhati/. 
Unknown to Kielhorn's mansucripts. 
 The variant readings by Bhart®hari show that he worked with several 
manuscripts. If the interpretation of Bhart®hari's verses which we considered above is 
correct, we must assume that Bhart®hari received his manuscripts, directly or indirectly, 
from Candra and his colleagues. We would not in that case expect so many variant 
readings. These variant readings may therefore be taken as an indication that 
Bhart®hari's verses have to be interpreted differently. 
 
7.  Peculiar readings accepted in the Mahåbhå∑ya-D¥pikå.  
 
 This same conclusion is supported in another way too. If Bhart®hari lived very 
near the time of the manuscripts from which all later manuscripts derive, we might 
expect that the text of the Mahåbhå∑ya which he knew, and to some extent even 
codified, is the ancestor of the archetype that our present manuscripts go back to. This 
does not seem to be the case. The Mahåbhå∑ya-D¥pikå contains indications that at times 
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it accepts without question a reading which today does not survive in any manuscripts, 
whereas it does not seem to be aware of the manuscript readings known to us. 
 Some examples of readings peculiar to Bhart®hari will now be given. It is to kept 
in mind that the bad state of our one surviving manuscript of the Mahåbhå∑ya-D¥pikå 
does not allow us to draw far-reaching conclusions from simple deviations between 
Bhå∑ya passages and their citation in the D¥pikå, as long as these deviations are not 
corroborated otherwise. 
 (i) Mbh I, p. 5, l. 28 - p. 6, l. 1 has caturbhiß ca prakårair viyopayuktå bhavaty 
ågamakålena svådhyåyakålena pravacanakålena vyavahårakåleneti. The manuscript of 
Bhart®hari's commentary cites the first part of this sentence as follows (Ms 6a9; Sw 
21.15; AL 17.4): caturbhiß ca prakårair vidyopayulko- [26] (or: vidyopakalko-) payuktå 
bhavati. This is easily emended into ... vidyopayuktopayuktå ... Bhart®hari's following 
discussion shows that this was indeed his accepted reading: 
 
caturbhiß ca prakårair vidyopayuktopayuktå bhavati/ ardho- (Ms atho-)payuktåpi 
saty anupayuktå bhavati ni∑phalatvåt/ athavå loke ekadeßopayogåd apy upayukta 
(Ms upayuktopayukta) iti gamyate/ tad yathopayuktaµ gh®tam iti/ evam idaµ 
naikadeßopayogåd upayuktam iti/ kiµ tarhi/ samudåyopayogåd upayuktam iti 
eva kathayati/ 
Knowledge when used in the four ways [to be specified in the sequel] is used [in 
the proper sense of the word]. Even when used half it is [properly speaking] 
unused because it carries not fruit. Alternatively, [something] is ‘used’ in the 
world even though [only] a part [of it] has been used. An example is: "Ghee has 
been used." Here [however] something is not in similar fashion [considered] 
‘used’ because a part [of it] has been used. Rather, one speaks [of something] as 
‘used’ because the totality [of it] has been used. 
 
This passage distinguishes throughout between two manners of ‘used’, viz. between 
‘incompletely used’ and ‘completely used’; only the latter is considered really ‘used’. 
These two meanings of ‘used’ correspond to the two occurrences of upayuktå in the 
Bhå∑ya passage. Kielhorn's manuscript A preserves the reading upayuktopayuktå. 
 (ii) Mbh I, p. 1, l. 18-19 quotes the following line: bråhmaˆena ni∑kåraˆo 
dharma˙ ∑a∂a∫go vedo 'dhyeyo jñeya[˙]. Bhart®hari cites this in the form bråhmaˆena 
ni∑kåraˆo dharma˙ ∑a∂a∫go vedo 'dhyeya[˙] (Ms 3c2-3; Sw 10.6; AL 8.18-19), without 
jñeya˙. A priori there is much to support Bhart®hari's reading. The words adhyeya˙ and 
jñeya˙ carry rather different meanings; adhi-i and its derivatives mean ‘memorizing’, 
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jñå ‘knowing, understanding’. Their difference is emphasized in a [27] verse quoted on 
the next page of the Mahåbhå∑ya (I, p. 2, l. 15-16); it reads: 
 
yad adh¥tam avijñåtaµ nigadenaiva ßabdyate/ 
anagnåv iva ßu∑kaidho na taj jvalati karhicit// 
What is memorized but not understood is uttered as mere Vedic recitation; like 
dry fuel where there is no fire, it does not burn at any time. 
 
Moreover, it is the duty of a Brahmin to memorize the Veda (svådhyåyo 'dhyetavya˙ 
TA 2.15; ÍB 11.5.6.3, 7.2, etc.), not to understand it. 
 These a priori considerations are supported by the fact that Kumårila Bha††a's 
Tantravårttika on PËrva M¥måµså SËtra 1.3.24 (p. 199) quotes the above line, in a 
discussion on the role of gramar in which lines from the first Óhnika of the Mahåbhå∑ya 
are repeatedly dealt with, in precisely the form used by Bhart®hari, i.e. without jñeya˙. 
Also Kielhorn's manuscript A is without jñeya˙. 
 We are entitled to conclude that the manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya used by 
Bhart®hari were without jñeya˙. 
 [A minor question remains: Did Kumårila obtain his reading from Bhart®hari or 
independently from manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya? There can be no doubt that 
Kumårila knew the Mahåbhå∑ya-D¥pikå: he quotes a verse20 from it which he ascribes 
to a †¥kåkåra to whom he also ascribes a verse which is found in the Våkyapad¥ya 
(2.14). Moreover, both Kumårila and Bhart®hari quote a line from the Mahåbhå∑ya on 
P. 6.1.84 vt. 5 in a context which deals with the first (Paspaßå) Óhnika of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya, both in the same incorrect form, viz. eka˙ ßabda˙ samyak jñåta˙ [28] 
suprayukta˙ ßåstrånvita˙ svarge loke kåmadhug bhavati (Kumårila on PËrva M¥måµså 
SËtra 1.3.24, p. 189; Bhart®hari: Ms 4d8-9; Sw 15.10-11; AL 12.15-16). The 
Mahåbhå∑ya (III.58.14-15) has the order of the words suprayukta˙ ßåstrånvita˙ 
reversed.21 Kumårila may for this reason be considered as giving evidence that the 
                                                
20 The verse is a∫gåni jñåtinåmåny upamå cendriyåˆi ca/ etåni nohaµ gacchanti adhrigau vi∑amaµ hi 
tat// which occurs in the Tantravårttika on PËrva M¥måµså SËtra 1.3.24 (p. 187), and in the Mahåbhå∑ya 
D¥pikå Ms 3a2-3; Sw 8.16-17; AL 7.10-11. See further Swaminathan, 1963: 69-70. 
21 We do not have to assume that Bhart®hari's manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya had the line in the form 
given by Bhart®hari. (i) For one thing, Bhart®hari tends to quote passages from the Mahåbhå∑ya other than 
those which he is imediately commenting upon inaccurately. One instance of this has ben discussed in 
Bronkhorst, 1985: 125 fn. 2. Another instance is Ms 7c9, Sw 26.17-19, AL 22.2-3: tathå coktam/ 
svabhåvato 'rthe∑u vartamånånåµ nimittatvenånvåkhyånaµ kriyate/ tad yathå/ kËpe hastadak∑iˆa iti/. The 
quotation is from Mbh I. 363.11-13 (on P. 2.1.1 vt. 1): svabhåvata ete∑åµ ßabdånåm ete∑v arthe∑v 
abhinivi∑†ånåµ nimittatvenånvåkhyånaµ kriyate/ tad yathå/ kËpe hastadak∑iˆa˙ panthå˙/. A third 
instance occurs in the third Óhnika (Ms 31b5-6; Sw 113.15-17; AL 96.4-6; CE III.3.20-22): yathå 
ana∂våham udahåri yåtvaµ vahasi ßiraså bhagini kumbhaµ såc¥nam abhidhåvantam adråk∑¥˙ iti. This is 
from Mbh I.152.26 - 153.1 (on P. 1.1.58 vt. 1): tad yathå/ ana∂våham udahåri yå tvaµ harasi ßiraså 
kumbhaµ bhagini såc¥nam abhidhåvantam adråk∑¥r iti/. (Note that the Yuktid¥pikå has the line in a form 
close to Bhart®hari's; cf. Bronkhorst, 1990: 129 with n. 9). (ii) Moreover, this same line is quoted again in 
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reading without jñeya˙ was found in Bhart®hari's commentary and in the manuscripts of 
the Mahåbhå∑ya used by Bhart®hari, not that this was the only reading in existence in 
those days.] 
 (iii) Mbh I, p. 6, l. 24-25 has athavå pËrvapadalopo 'tra dra∑†avya˙. Bhart®hari 
cites this as athavå pËrvottarapadalopo 'tra dra∑†avya˙ (Ms 8c3; Sw 29.15; AL 24.16). 
His immediately following sentence reads ka˙ punar ayaµ pËrvottarapadopåya˙, which 
confirms that uttara really belongs here. Further confirmation comes a few lines later 
(Ms 8c6; Sw 29.22-23; AL 24.22-23) where by way of illustration it is stated: 
satyabhåmå-[29]ßabdena saha satyaßabdo bhåmåßabdaß ca ni∑pådyate. Here both 
‘Satya’ and ‘Bhåmå’ are given as abbreviations of the name ‘Satyabhåmå’. But in order 
to obtain ‘Satya’ on the basis of ‘Satyabhåmå’, we need elision of the last part of the 
compound (uttarapadalopa). Bhart®hari similarly mentions jye as an (incorrect) 
abbreviation of jye∑†hå in the same context (Ms 8c7; Sw 29.24; AL 24.24)22 which 
would be inappropriate without the word uttara in the Bhå∑ya. The reading with uttara is 
not found in any of Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
 (iv) Mbh I, p. 7, l. 20 has na kvacid uparateti k®två sarvatroparatå bhavati 
dravyåntarasthå tËpalabhyate. Bhart®hari's commentary quotes this as (Ms 9b5-6 & 9; 
Sw 32.22 & 33.1; AL 27.13 & 19): na kvacid uparateti k®tvåta˙ sarvatroparatå bhavati 
... dravyåntarasthopalabhyate. The element ata˙ is found again in this passage as quoted 
in the comentary on the Nirukta ascribed to Skandasvåmin-Maheßvara (I, p. 16, l. 16 - 
p. 17, l. 1): na kvacid uparatety ata˙ sarvatroparatå bhavati. The element tu of 
Kielhorn's edition was apparently not known to Bhart®hari, because he explains 
dravyåntarasthåbhivyajyate, again without tu. Skandasvåmin-Maheßvara quote the 
remainder of the sentence as piˆ∂åntarasthopalabhyate, also without tu. Ata˙ and the 
reading without tu are not found in Kielhorn's manuscripts. 
 The following example is less decisive, yet deserves consideration: 
 (v) Mbh I, p. 11, l. 4 has athavåbhyupåya evåpaßabdajñånaµ ßabdajñåne. 
Bhart®hari cites this as athavåbhyupåya evåpaßabdajñånaµ ßabdajñånasya (Ms 12a6; 
Sw 44.13; AL 37.10). The very next sentence begins yaß ca yasyåbhyupåya˙ ..., thus 
suggesting that the reading ßabdajñånasya is no error. It does not occur in Kielhorn's 
manuscripts. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
the D¥pikå at Ms 11c4--5, Sw 42.3-4, AL 35.10-11 in the form eka˙ ßabda˙ samyak jñåta˙ 
ßåstrådidu∑åprayukta˙ svarge loke kåmadhug bhavati. If we accept ßåstrådidu∑åprayukta˙ to be a 
corruption of ßåstrånvita˙ suprayukta˙ we have proof that Bhart®hari knew the line in the form known 
from Kielhorn's Mahåbhå∑ya. 
22 Also in VP 2.363 (361 in Iyer's edition) and in the V®tti thereon. 
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8. Bhart®hari 's  position in the text history of the Mahåbhå∑ya. 
 
 The evidence here collected shows, first of all, that Bhart®hari knew manuscripts 
which have no apparent relationship with [30] the ones surviving today. It seems 
therefore most reasonable to place him, not on the main line of transmission of 
Mahåbhå∑ya manuscripts, but rather among some of the side branches which apparently 




   archetype
extant manuscripts 
 
 We cannot, however, leave Bhart®hari without paying some attention to 
Kielhorn's manuscript A, which in two cases - (i) and (ii) of section 7 - has the same 
reading as Bhart®hari. How is this to be explained? 
 The most likely explanation is no doubt that a learned scribe, under the influence 
of Bhart®hari's commentary, introduced these readings into the text. There is however 
another possibility which deserves consideration. It requires that we know something 
more [31] about this manuscript A and how it has been used in the edition of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya. Kielhorn describes his use of this manuscripts in a footnote to his Preface 
to the First Edition of the Mahåbhå∑ya, a footnote which was apparently added after the 
preparation of the second edition, in the following words (I, p. 10, fn.1): "While 
revising the text for the second edition, I have occasionally compared also the MSS. A. 
and K., described in the preface of Vol. II.; but I have not been able to use these MSS. 
throughout." This means that Kielhorn's edition by itself may not always contain 
enough information to decide whether readings peculiar to Bhart®hari are present in 
manuscript A as well. A closer comparison of manuscript A with the text of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya as known to Bhart®hari remains a desideratum. 
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 Kielhorn describes manuscript A in his Preface to the First Edition, Vol. II, 
which in Abhyankar's edition of the text has been placed in the beginning of Vol. III 
(pp. 11-33). We read there (p. 11) that manuscript A is "a carefully made and complete 
copy of the whole Mahåbhå∑ya, written for Ananta-sarasvat¥ by one Jågeßvara at 
V®ddhinagara (Va∂nagar) in Saµvat 1545 and 1546." What interests us here in 
particular is that the manuscript came from Va∂nagar. This is a small town in Gujarat, 
north of Ahmedabad. Of all the other manuscripts used by Kielhorn none came from 
Gujarat; all of them came from different parts of India. 
 This information is of particular interest for the following reason. There are 
independent reasons to think that Bhart®hari lived in Gujarat or northern Mahårå∑†ra. I 
have discussed these reasons in an article which came out a few years ago (1983: 395-
397). Is it coincidence that the Mahåbhå∑ya manuscript from Gujarat is the only one to 
preserve readings known to Bhart®hari? It may be so, yet it is tempting to consider the 
possibility that the text tradition of the Mahåbhå∑ya as known to Bhart®hari survived for 
a long time in Western India, and even influenced - ‘contaminated’ - the text tradition 
which was to become standard, and which became the basis of Kielhorn's edition of this 
text. 
[32] 
 It may or may not be possible to answer the above question. If it can be 
answered at all, it is only on the basis of a thorough study of Mahåbhå∑ya manuscripts 
from Western India.23  
 
9.  Kaiya†a.  
 
 We turn to another important author connected with the Mahåbhå∑ya; this is 
Kaiya†a. Kaiya†a is the most famous commentator on the Mahåbhå∑ya. He lived many 
centuries after Bhart®hari, but admits his indebtedness to the latter in the introductory 
verses of his commentary. We shall see that this indebtedness may have extended 
farther than we would expect. 
 There is reason to believe that all the variant readings recorded in Kaiya†a's 
Prad¥pa on the first seven Óhnikas of the Mahåbhå∑ya were taken from Bhart®hari's 
D¥pikå.24 Seven of the variant readings mentioned by Kaiya†a have been noted above 
under numbers (iii), (v), (vi), (ix), (x), (xv) and (xvi) of section 6. There is only one 
further variant reading recorded by Kaiya†a in the first seven Óhnikas, viz., on Mbh I, p. 
                                                
23 With the kind permission of the authorities I have been able to inspect two Mahåbhå∑ya manuscripts 
in Gujarat: nr. 937 in the Shri Hemachandracharya Jain Jnanamandir, in Patan; and nr. 2796 of the 
Muniråja Sr¥ Puˆyavijayaji Collection in the L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad. Both these 
manuscripts agree with the majority of Kielhorn's manuscripts, and not with his manuscript A. 
24 This was already observed by Kielhorn (1880-1885: III: 24 fn. 1). 
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76, l. 17 (on P. 1.1.21 vt. 1), i.e., on p. 187 of the edition of the Prad¥pa. Here the 
manuscript of the Mahåbhå∑ya-D¥pikå shows a gap; the whole of the D¥pikå on P. 
1.1.21 is lost, as has been pointed out by the editors and translators of this part of the 
text - V. P. Limaye, G. B. Palsule, and V. B. Bhagavat - in their ‘Notes’ (see CE V 
Notes p. 145). 
 The chance that Kaiya†a would record variant readings only where Bhart®hari's 
D¥pikå does so without following Bhart®hari is diminishingly small and can be rejected. 
The extremely bad [33] condition of the manuscript of the Mahåbhå∑ya-D¥pikå, 
moreover, does not allow us to draw any conclusions from the fact that Kaiya†a's 
formulations sometimes seem to deviate from Bhart®hari's. 
 The situation being as described, it is very tempting to develop the following 
hypothesis. For reasons which will be considered below, Kaiya†a followed Bhart®hari 
throughout in the matter of variant readings. As a matter of fact, Kaiya†a's close 
adherence to Bhart®hari in all other matters is patent when corresponding portions of the 
two commentaries are read side by side. Indeed, the introductory verses to Kaiya†a's 
Prad¥pa mention [Bhart®-]hari's commentary and compare it to the bridge (setu) used by 
Kaiya†a, who is "like a cripple (pa∫guvat)", in order to reach the other shore of the 
ocean which is the Mahåbhå∑ya.25 
 We cannot of course exclude the possibility that Kaiya†a derived variant 
readings from other manuscripts later on in his study of the Mahåbhå∑ya. We do not, 
however, have any indication that this is what he did. It may well be that all the variant 
readings recorded by Kaiya†a, throughout the Mahåbhå∑ya, were copied from 
Bhart®hari's commentary. 
 
10.The original extent of Bhart®hari 's  commentary.  
 
 This, if true, provides us with a method to find out what part of the Mahåbhå∑ya 
was commented upon by the Mahåbhå∑ya-D¥pikå as it was known to Kaiya†a. As we 
know, the opinion has been defended that Bhart®hari's original commentary did not 
cover more than the first three Pådas of the Mahåbhå∑ya. This position has been 
defended most vigorously by Ashok Aklujkar (1971), who has three arguments to 
support it. His first argument is that Vardhamåna describes Bhart®hari as "the explainer 
of three Pådas of the Mahåbhå∑ya" (mahåbhå∑yatripådyå vyåkhyåtå). But [34] 
Vardhamåna lived in the twelfth century, which is long after Bhart®hari.26 Aklujkar's 
                                                
25 Joshi and Roodbergen's claim (1986: 4 fn. 8) that the reference is to the Våkyapad¥ya is completely 
unsupported and difficult to understand. 
26 Note Belvalkar's suggestion (1915: 35 fn. 3) that the ‘Tripåd¥’ is the Våkyapad¥ya, and compare this 
with Helåråja's remark below. 
THREE PROBLEMS  28 
 
 
second argument is a line in Helåråja's commentary which reads: trailokyagåmin¥ yena 
trikåˆ∂¥ tripad¥ k®tå. Aklujkar thinks that "it is obvious that Tripad¥ is the same as 
Tripåd¥" (p. 162 n. 1), but Yudhi∑†hira M¥måµsaka (1973: I: 376) rightly points out that 
this evidence is of dubious value. 
 Aklujkar's third argument is that I-ching gives the extent of Bhart®hari's 
commentary as 25,000 ßlokas. Since the surviving part of Bhart®hari's commentary, 
which covers about two-thirds of the first Påda, has an approximate extent of 5,700 
ßlokas, Aklujkar concludes (p. 163): "It is clear then that 25,000 ßloka-s could not have 
been the extent of a work that covered more than three påda-s." Aklujkar points out in a 
footnote that Kielhorn (1883: 226 (185)) and Y. M¥måµsaka (1973: I: 373) arrived at 
the same conclusion. 
 It is clear that I-ching's testimony, dating from the seventh century and being 
therefore the earliest evidence available, carries great weight. Let us look at it more 
closely. In Kielhorn's edition the first seven Óhnikas of the Mahåbhå∑ya - i.e., the part 
on which Bhart®hari's commentary has survived - cover 132 pages. The first three Pådas 
fill altogether 295 pages, that is slightly more than twice as many. According to 
Aklujkar's theory, Bhart®hari's commentary on the second half of the first three Pådas 
covered more than three times the number of pages which Bhart®hari needed for the 
first seven Óhnikas. Add to this that Bhart®hari's surviving commentary is extremely 
elaborate, and it will be clear that the idea that the remainder of his commentary was 
almost thrice as elaborate is completely unacceptable. The opposite view that his 
commentary became less elaborate as he proceeded, represents a real possibility, or 
even a probability.27 [35] I-ching's account of the extent of Bhart®hari's commentary is 
therefore compatible with the view that this commentary originally covered the whole 
of the Mahåbhå∑ya. 
 Aklujkar's argument is further marred by the fact that he has to provide rather 
forced explanations in order to acount for some seeming references in later authors to 
parts of Bhart®hari's commentary which according to Aklujkar never existed. 
 This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of all these problems. We 
considered the possibility that Kaiya†a derived all his variant readings in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya from Bhart®hari's commentary. Kaiya†a records variant readings fairly 
regularly throughout the Mahåbhå∑ya. The last one occurs on P. 8.4.68 (III, p. 510), i.e., 
on the very last sËtra discussed in the Mahåbhå∑ya. This may be taken as additional 
evidence in support of the view that Bhart®hari's commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya 
originally covered the whole of that text. 
                                                
27 Kaiya†a's commentary is more or less equally divided over the different portions. Barring counting 
mistakes, it fills 2977 lines in the Rohataka edition on the first 9 Óhnikas, 3342 lines on the remainder of 
the first 3 Pådas. 




11.  Further supporting evidence.  
 
 The theory that Kaiya†a borrowed all or almost all his variant readings from 
Bhart®hari is attractive, but further supporting evidence would make it stronger. It is not 
easy to find such further evidence.28 Direct information regarding the shape of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya as it was known to Bhart®hari is lacking, apart from the small portion 
covered by the surviving part of Bhart®hari's commentary. We do, however, seem to 
have some, if ever so limited, information about the Mahåbhå∑ya as it existed in the 
centuries before Bhart®hari. This information is indirect and must be dealt with 
carefully. A few introductory remarks are therefore necessary. 
 The Kåßikå contains many phrases and passages which look like quotations from 
the Mahåbhå∑ya. In the majority of cases these are identical with their prototypes in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya. Sometimes, however, they seem to have been adjusted to the [36] specific 
needs of the Kåßikå, and are not therefore identical with their prototypes. A third 
category is constituted by the cases where it is hard to see why changes should have 
been introduced, yet the ‘quoted’ lines differ from the corresponding lines in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya. Some of these last cases might be considered testimony of the, or an, 
earlier shape of the Mahåbhå∑ya. 
 It is known that the Kåßikå made use of one or more earlier works - most 
probably one or more commentaries on the A∑†ådhyåy¥ - which work(s) also influenced 
the grammar of Candra(-gomin).29 It is likely that the lines in the Kåßikå which deviate 
from the Mahåbhå∑ya were borrowed, not directly from the Mahåbhå∑ya, but through 
the intermediary of this other work or these other works. 
 There is evidence which supports this. Some of the deviating phrases in the 
Kåßikå are found identically in Candra's grammar. The following are examples: 
 (i) All the manuscripts inspected by Kielhorn give the following example in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 1.3.20 vt. 2: vyådadate pip¥likå˙ pata∫gamukham. The Kåßikå on P. 
1.3.20 and Candra on C. 1.4.55 give the same example as vyådadate pip¥likå˙ 
pata∫gasya mukham. 
 (ii) The Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 1.3.27 vt. 1 (all manuscripts) reads: uttapate påˆ¥/ 
vitapate påˆ¥/. The Kåßikå and Candra on C. 1.4.74 read this as uttapate påˆim (...) 
vitapate påˆim. 
                                                
28 One point has been discussed in Bronkhorst, 1983: 374-75. 
29 See Bronkhorst, 1983: esp. pp. 379 ff. 
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 (iii) The Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 1.4.52 vt. 7 (all manuscripts) illustrates: bhak∑ayanti/ 
bhak∑ayati bal¥vardån yavån. The Kåßikå and Candra on C. 2.1.49 have: bhak∑ayanti/ 
bhak∑ayati bal¥vardån sasyam.30 
[37] 
 (iv) The Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 2.2.24 vt. 13 (I, p. 242, l. 1; all manuscripts) reads: 
keßånåµ samåhåraß cË∂å asya keßacË∂a˙. Some manuscripts of the Kåßikå and Candra 
on C. 2.2.46 read: keßasaµghåtaß cË∂å aasya keßacË∂a˙. 
 This enumeration is by no means complete; yet it shows that we have to choose 
one out of two alternatives. The first one is that the Kåßikå, and presumably Candra, 
quoted directly from the Mahåbhå∑ya. In that case we have to accept that the 
Mahåbhå∑ya which they knew differed from its present form in certain respects. The 
second and more likely alternative is that the Bhå∑ya quotations in the Kåßikå and in 
Candra reached these texts through the intermediary of one or more other, earlier, texts. 
The deviations in the Kåßikå may then bear witness to the state of the Mahåbhå∑ya in 
the time before Candra, or they must be explained as due to the carelessness or 
imagination of the author(s) of these earlier texts. 
 All this shows that the deviant readings in the Kåßikå must be treated with 
caution. We should furthermore be aware that the tendency in recent centuries may 
have been to adjust the text of the Kåßikå to the accepted text of the Mahåbhå∑ya, i.e., to 
the text as we find it in Kielhorn's edition. It is difficult, probably impossible, to 
determine the extent to which this adjustment has affected the manuscripts of the 
Kåßikå, but we can form an impression by comparing the corrupt Vedic quotations in 
the Mahåbhå∑ya with the Kåßikå. We have seen that Rau could correct a number of 
these quotations. Most of these quotations do not occur in the Kåßikå, but some do, and 
they present the following picture: 
 (i) Rau (1985: 54) proposes the following emendation for a line quoted in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 7.4.48 vt. 1 (III, p. 351, l. 25; p. 352, l. 3): mådhi∑†vå candro v®trahå. 
Both the Mahåbhå∑ya and the Kåßikå contain the presumably incorrect line mådbhir 
i∑†vå indro v®trahå. 
[38] 
 (ii) Rau (1985: 38) proposes to read dadbhi˙ psåtam for adbhi˙ psåtam in the 
Bhå∑ya on P. 8.3.37 vt. 2 (III, p. 431, l. 14-15) and in the same supposedly incorrect 
form in the Kåßikå. 
 (iii) An interesting case is the line dårviyå parijman in the Bhå∑ya on P. 7.1.39 
vt. 1 (III, p. 256, l. 23). Limaye (1974: 619) proposes the emendation urviyå pari khyan. 
The Kåßikå has both these lines. 
                                                
30 For a discussion of the meaning of this line in its context, see Wezler, 1986. 




Against these cases where the Kåßikå seems to have adopted readings from the recent 
version of the Mahåbhå∑ya, there are others where the Kåßikå appears to embody a 
different, and better, tradition: 
 (i) The Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 6.1.76 vt. 1 (III, p. 51, l. 22) quotes: na (c)chåyåµ 
kuravo 'paråm. The last word must be 'param, and this is how the line is quoted in the 
Kåßikå (apparently in all the manuscripts used by the editors). 
 (ii) The Bhå∑ya on P. 6.2.199 vt. 1 (III, p. 140, l. 12) misquotes the line 
tricakreˆa trivandhureˆa triv®tå rathena. The first word tricakreˆa belongs at the end, 
and that is where we find it in the Kåßikå. 
 (iii) Kielhorn himself was sometimes convinced ot the superiority of the reading 
in the Kåßikå. On P. 5.4.27 vt. 5 (II, p. 434, l. 14) he accepts the reading åyur varcasyam 
against the evidence of all his manuscripts, on the strength of the occurrence of åyur 
varcasya˙ in his manuscript of the Kåßikå on P. 5.4.25. (Note that all the manuscripts 
used by Aryendra Sharma et al. have våyur varcasya˙, which agrees better with some of 
Kielhorn's manuscripts.)31 
[39] 
 This evidence justifies a certain amount of confidence that the Kåßikå may 
provide us with independent Bhå∑ya readings in certain cases. These readings, 
moreover, may date back to the time preceding Candra, if indeed they reached the 
Kåßikå through earlier works. 
 With this in mind, we look at the Bhå∑ya on P. 5.3.45 vt. 1, where we find the 
illustration pathi dvaidhåni. A number of Kåßikå manuscripts read matidvaidhåni in this 
context; the reading pathi dvaidhåni in other manuscripts may be explained by the 
influence from the Mahåbhå∑ya tradition. The reading matidvaidhåni is moreover 
recorded by Kaiya†a as a variant! Kaiya†a never records reading found in the Kåßikå, so 
we may be sure that this reading occurred at some time in some manuscripts of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya. The fact that the Kåßikå has this reading may be taken as an indication 
that it may have been in existence in the time before Candra. 
 Even more interesting in this connection is Kaiya†a's rejection of the reading 
pa†ukalpå in the Bhå∑ya on P. 6.3.35 vt. 4; Kaiya†a prefers darßan¥yakalpå. But 
pa†ukalpå occurs under the corresponding rule in Candra's grammar, C. 5.2.31, even 
though Kaiya†a's criticism of this form would also hold in Candra's grammar. We may 
                                                
31 Kielhorn is again influenced by the Kåßikå on P. 4.1.66 (II, p. 227, l. 7), where he chooses the reading 
dh¥vabandhË because he finds it in the Kåßikå. Here too Kielhorn's manuscripts of the Kåßikå differ from 
those used by Aryendra Sharma et al.; the latter have throughout v¥rabandhË at all the places indicated by 
Kielhorn, or nothing at all. 
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conclude from this that here again the variant reading recorded by Kaiya†a existed 
already during the time of, or before, Candra.32 
 Kaiya†a records the variant d¥rghaplutaprati∑edha˙ for d¥rghaprati∑edha˙ in P. 
8.4.68 vt. 1. The Kåßikå on this sËtra contains the line d¥rghaplutayoß cånena viv®tena 
akåreˆa grahaˆaµ ne∑yate, which may indicate that it knew - directly or indirectly - the 
vårttika concerned with the variant recorded by Kaiya†a. 
[40] 
 These three cases support the view that at least some, and perhaps all the variant 
readings recorded by Kaiya†a existed before Candra, and may indeed have been 
borrowed by Kaiya†a from Bhart®hari. 
 
12.  Kaiya†a's  manuscripts.  
 
 We turn to the question why Kaiya†a borrowed his variant readings from 
Bhart®hari. In order to answer this question we may recall that Kaiya†a most probably 
lived in the eleventh century, not long after the probable date of the archetype of extant 
Mahåbhå∑ya manuscripts. We may further bring to mind that Kaiya†a hardly ever has a 
reading which deviates from the extant manuscripts, except where he records variant 
readings, i.e., where we suspect the inflence of Bhart®hari. It seems therefore that 
Kaiya†a used as manuscripts one or more descendants from the archetype and those 
only. Few variant readings had yet found their way into these manuscripts. 
 Some remarks by Kaiya†a himself support this view. Commenting on the 
concluding lines of the Bhå∑ya on P. 6.1.162, Kaiya†a expresses the view that the 
correct order of sentences has been changed due to the carelessness of a scribe 
(lekhakapramådåt tu sthånåntare nyasta˙). On the concluding lines of the Bhå∑ya on P. 
8.4.47, similarly, Kaiya†a claims that carelessness of a scribe is responsible for the 
incorrect shape of the text (på†ho 'yaµ lekhakapramådån na∑†a˙). Kaiya†a does not give 
any indication that he knew a manuscript which had the sentences in the correct order. 
In other words, he admits that the manuscript(s) he used could have been affected by 
one single scribe. This leaves two possibilities: either Kaiya†a used no more than one 
manuscript; or he used several, but considered it possible - or even certain - that they all 
derived from one shared archetype. 
 
                                                
32 A correct evaluation of this and the next case is hampered by the fact that the third volume of 
Kielhorn's edition of the Mahåbhå∑ya has no critical apparatus. 
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13. Råjatara∫giˆ¥ 4.488-89. 
 
 To what extent can Kaiya†a's position with regard to the text of the Mahåbhå∑ya 
be connected with the enigmatic account of [41] the history of the Mahåbhå∑ya in the 
fourth book of Kalhaˆa's Råjatara∫giˆ¥? Kaiya†a's name suggests that he came from 
Kashmir, and the Råjatara∫giˆ¥ deals with the history of Kashmir. Verses 4.488-89 
recount that the Mahåbhå∑ya had ceased to be studied in Kashmir; a revival was 
brought about by kind Jayåp¥∂a, who was a pupil of the grammarian K∑¥ra.33 
 If we take Kalhaˆa at his word it will not be possible to connect the events here 
described with the archetype of the Mahåbhå∑ya underlying the manuscripts know to 
Kaiya†a, and to us. King Jayåp¥∂a ruled in the eighth century, and the archetype of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya dates from around 1000. But we may consider the possibility that 
Kalhaˆa's account is not fully reliable here. Apart from the Råjatara∫giˆ¥ there is no 
evidence that Jayåp¥∂a did what is here ascribed to him. Nor do we know of a 
grammarian named K∑¥ra who lived in that century. We do know, however, of a 
grammarian K∑¥ra(-svåmin) in Kashmir who lived in or before the middle of the 
eleventh century (Belvalkar, 1915: 43; M¥måµsaka, 1973: II: 89 f.). If we tentatively 
assume that Kalhaˆa wrongly attributed an event connected with the grammarian 
K∑¥rasvåmin, which took place in the eleventh century, to king Jayåp¥∂a, and therefore 
to the eighth century, the three strands which we have considered - the archetype of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya, Kaiya†a, and the account in the Råjatara∫giˆ¥ - come together in the 
beginning of the eleventh century, in Kashmir. It must of course be admitted that this 
conclusion is highly speculative, but perhaps these speculations can give rise to fruitful 
research in the future. 
 
14.  Conclusions.  
 
 With Kaiya†a we have come back at the point from which we started. It seems 
likely that Kaiya†a belongs to the text [42] tradition of the Mahåbhå∑ya to which also 
Kielhorn's edition belongs. This text tradition goes back to one shared archetype, which 
seems to date from a time not long before Kaiya†a. 
 The idea that this archetype itself is a descendant of the text used by Bhart®hari 
cannot be taken for granted. The text commented upon by Bhart®hari deviates in some 
essential points from the text of the archetype. What is more, it is clear from 
                                                
33 Råjatara∫giˆ¥ 4.488-89 read: deßåntaråd ågamayya vyåcak∑åˆån k∑amåpati˙/ pråvartayata vicchinnaµ 
mahåbhå∑yaµ svamaˆ∂ale// k∑¥råbhidhåc chabdavidyopådhyåyåt saµbh®taßruta˙/ budhai˙ saha yayau 
v®ddhiµ sa jayåp¥∂apaˆ∂ita˙//. 
THREE PROBLEMS  34 
 
 
Bhart®hari's commentary that he used different manuscripts which differed from each 
other in a number of points. 




III. THE MAHÓBHÓ›YA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
1.  The date of the Mahåbhå∑ya. 
 
 The Mahåbhå∑ya is an old text; this much we know. But how old is it exactly? 
In the second lecture of this series we say that the Mahåbhå∑ya was commented upon 
by Bhart®hari. It was also clear that the text must have been in existence for quite a 
while before Bhart®hari: Bhart®hari knows a number of variant readings, and what is 
more, the extant manuscripts of the Mahåbhå∑ya do not seem to derive from the copies 
used by Bhart®hari. Then there are the verses at the end of the second Kåˆ∂a of the 
Våkyapad¥ya, according to which the tradition of the Mahåbhå∑ya had been largely lost. 
All this makes clear that the Mahåbhå∑ya already in the days of Bhart®hari had a long 
history. 
 Bhart®hari lived no later than the fifth century C.E.34 The Mahåbhå∑ya must date 
from several centuries before this at the latest. 
 Is it possible to determine the date of the Mahåbhå∑ya more precisely? The 
question has been much debated,35 and it seems certain that the Mahåbhå∑ya was 
written around 150 B.C.E., or later. The crucial evidence in the Mahåbhå∑ya consists of 
some examples, among them the following two: 
 
 (i) aruˆad yavana˙ såketam "The Yavana besieged Såketa". 
 (ii) aruˆad yavana˙ madhyamikåm "The Yavana besieged Madhyamikå". 
 
These two examples occur under P. 3.2.111 vt. 2, and illustrate the use of the suffix la∫ 
in order to describe an event [44] that took place in the past before today, was not 
witnessed by the speaker but might have been witnessed by him, and is widely known. 
The Yavana in the examples has been identified as kind Menander. Patañjali must 
therefore have been a contemporary of Menander, which determines his date to be 
around 150 B.C.E. 
 Several scholars have pointed out that this argument is valid only if we can be 
sure that Patañjali himself introduced these examples. If he borrowed them from an 
earlier grammarian, they merely indicate that Patañjali lived after this date of around 
150 B.C.E. 
                                                
34 See Cardona, 1976: 298-99, for a brief survey of the relevant literature. 
35 For a useful survey see Joshi and Roodbergen, 1976: i-xxxiv. 
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 This is not the place to try to reach a final solution to this problem. It has 
occupied the minds of prominent Indologists for a long time, without having been 
definitely solved. This is unfortunate because much depends on the correct solution of 
this problem. Once Patañjali's date can be fixed with some degree of certainty, we have 
a fixed point in the literary history of India, where there is a dearth of such fixed points. 
We need Patañjali's date in order to make informed guesses about the date of Påˆini, 
and the date of Påˆini is one of the two main pillars on which traditionally our ideas of 
Vedic chronology are based. 
 I must add, however, that most scholars accept that Patañjali lived about 150 
B.C.E., and that I shall do the same in the remainder of this lecture. But we must keep 
in mind that this date is not absolutely certain. 
 
2 The relevance of the Mahåbhå∑ya for the study of Indian philosophy. 
 
 It seems, then, that the Mahåbhå∑ya existed already before the beginning of the 
Christian era. This raises interesting questions about the relationship between the 
Mahåbhå∑ya and the development of systematic philosophy in India. The treatises 
which we now possess on the different systems of Brahmanic philosophy all seem to 
date from the Christian era at the earliest, and in a number of cases from a demonstrably 
later date. The [45] Mahåbhå∑ya appears to belong to a period when systematic 
philosophy in India was in its infancy, or even did not yet exist. It is therefore well 
worth studying from a philosophical point of view. But I am not going to present you 
with a complete philosophical study of the Mahåbhå∑ya during this lecture. That would 
of course be impossible. I shall rather confine myself to a single question, namely the 
question of the nature of the word and of the individual sound. 
 We start from some observations made by Erich Frauwallner in a short article 
about the infiltration of linguistic theory into the Indian philosophical systems ("Das 
Eindringen der Sprachtheorie in die indischen philosophischen Systeme", 1960).36 
 Frauwallner argued that ideas about the nature of the word entered from 
grammar into the Brahmanical systems. In this context he mentioned M¥måµså in 
particular. This system looks upon the constituent sounds of words as being eternal, but 
denies the existence of a whole word different from the sounds. In this way the 
eternality of the Veda is meant to be proved, which is odd. Frauwallner explains the 
difficulty with the help of the influence of Vaiße∑ika ideas on M¥måµså. The idea of the 
sound as an eternal entity was borrowed from the grammarians. The grammarians, 
however, also accepted the word as an eternal entity. Philosophical ideas borrowed 
                                                
36 The contents of this article are largely repeated and expanded in Frauwallner, 1961. 
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from Vaiße∑ika left no space for words as independent entities; only sounds could be 
accepted as such. 
 Frauwallner is aware of the chronological implications of this view. It means 
that the doctrine of eternal sounds is relatively recent in M¥måµså. And indeed, 
Frauwallner can adduce arguments which make it probable that the M¥måµså sËtras 
(M¥SË 1.1.6-23) in which this view is defended, are a later insertion into the SËtra text. 
If we remove these sËtras the remainder fits well together. SËtra 1.1.5 establishes that 
the [46] connection between word and meaning is natural (autpattika). SËtra 1.1.24 
takes up this same issue and raises the objection that if such be the case (utpattau), 
sentences would not naturally have a meaning. Frauwallner draws attention to the 
similarity in wording between the two sËtras: autpattika in the one, utpatti in the other. 
He finally points out that the so-called V®ttikåragrantha, which occurs in Íabara's 
Bhå∑ya on M¥SË 1.1.5, ascribes the doctrine that words are nothing but their constituent 
sounds to Upavar∑a, an early commentator on the M¥måµså SËtra.37 
 Frauwallner compares the eternal individual sounds of the M¥måµsakas with the 
varˆaspho†a of the grammarians, and thinks that they owe their existence to this 
concept. The idea of a varˆaspho†a is however derived from that of a padaspho†a. This 
in its turn means that a development must have taken place within the grammatical 
tradition in the time before these ideas made their appearance in the M¥måµså texts. 
Patañjali's Mahåbhå∑ya is unfortunately of little use for studying this development. In 
Frauwallner's opinion Patañjali has no understanding whatsoever of linguistic theory 
and of philosophy. 
 Frauwallner's low opinion of Patañjali has been criticized by subsequent 
scholars,38 but only in general terms. The question remains whether we can learn 
anything from the Mahåbhå∑ya about the problem that engaged Frauwallner, that is, 
about the nature of sound and word. The remainder of this lecture will be dedicated to 
this question. 
 
3.  The nature of sound and word. 
 
 Regarding the nature of sound we can be brief. It appears that Patañjali knew the 
idea of an individual sound conceived of as an entity, different from its particular pro-
nunciation by various [47] people in differing circumstances. His use of the word 
spho†a confirms this. 
                                                
37 Frauwallner, 1961: 121 (319); 1968: 38. 
38 Biardeau, 1964: 31 n. 1; Staal, 1967: 48-49 n. 19; Cardona, 1976: 259. 
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 Patañjali uses the word spho†a at only two occasions, both times in connection 
with individual speech sounds. On P. 1.1.70 vt. 5 he distinguishes between the spho†a, 
which is the ßabda, and the dhvani, which is a quality of the ßabda.39 It is true that the 
two passages in which Patañjali uses the term spho†a pose some difficulties of 
interpretation,40 but these do not affect the main conclusion that for Patañjali there 
existed a sound entity different from the ‘noise’ that expressed, or perhaps: 
accompanied, it. 
 Patañjali is also aware of the notion of an eternal and unchanging sound (varˆa). 
We find it under ÍivasËtra 1 vt. 12,41 while under P. 1.1.70 vt. 5 Patañjali calls the 
sounds fixed (avasthita). 
 The relationship between sounds and words is perhaps most clearly discussed in 
the second Óhnika of the Mahåbhå∑ya (I, p. 30, l. 1 ff.). The question raised is whether 
individual sounds have meaning or not. A number of arguments support the view that 
they do, among them the observation that a collection (saµghåta) of sounds has 
meaning. Other arguments are adduced to show that individual sounds have no 
meaning, which comes closer to Patañjali's own opinion that most single sounds have 
no meaning, while certain verbal roots, suffixes, nominal stems and particles which 
consist of one sound do have meaning. Somewhere in this discussion Patañjali makes 
the remark (I, p. 31, l. 10): 
 
 saµghåtasyaikatvam artha˙ 
 
This seems to mean: "The collection is one single [entity, and this] one-ness is the 
meaning." 
[48] 
 This remark is very noticeable, because there was no need whatsoever for 
Patañjali to make it. It is made by way of explanation of an expression in a vårttika 
(ÍivasËtra 5 vt. 13) which reads saµghåtasyaikårthyåt "because a collection has one 
single meaning". Patañjali here goes beyond the vårttika he is explaining, in that he 
states that a collection is a single entity. This statement is not further explained, nor 
does it play a significant role in the discussion. 
 It is not hard to imagine why Patañjali postulates the existence of a collection of 
sounds as one single entity. Individual sounds do not occur simultaneously, not even in 
                                                
39 I, p. 181, l. 19-20: evaµ tarhi spho†a˙ ßabdo dhvani˙ ßabdaguˆa˙ 
40 See Joshi, 1967: 13 f. 
41 I, p. 18, l. 14-15: nitye∑u ca ßabde∑u kË†asthair avicålibhir varˆair bhavitavyam 
anapåyopajanavikåribhi˙. 
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a single word. In another context42 Patañjali points out that in the word gau˙ the sounds 
au and ˙ are not there while g is being pronounced, and similarly about the other 
sounds. For sounds disappear as soon as they have arisen (uccaritapradhvaµsina˙ khalv 
api varˆå˙). No single sound is the companion of another sound (na varˆo varˆasya 
sahåya˙). Seen in this way it is hard to assign any form of existence whatsoever to 
words. 
 Yet Patañjali looks upon words as existing entities and, what is more, as eternal 
entities. Part of a vårttika in the first Óhnika43 reads siddhe ßabdårthasaµbandhe; 
Patañjali analyzes this as siddhe ßabde 'rthasaµbandhe ca (Mbh I, p. 6, l. 17) and inter-
prets siddha to mean nitya ‘eternal’. In Patañjali's interpretation therefore (which is 
almost certainly different from the one intended by the author of the vårttika) the word, 
its meaning (or denoted object), and the relation between the two are here stated to be 
eternal. But for a word to be eternal it has to exist first, and this makes it all the more 
understandable that Patañjali postulates the existence of a collection of sounds as one 
single entity. 
 In order to understand what kind of entity a word is we return to the passage 
where Patañjali explained that the sounds of a word are not pronounced simultaneously. 
After this Patañjali [49] quotes a verse, then comments upon it in the following manner 
(Mbh I, p. 356, l. 9-13): 
 
buddhivi∑ayam evaßabdånåµ paurvåparyam/ iha ya e∑a manu∑ya˙ 
prek∑åpËrvakår¥ bhavati sa paßyaty asminn arthe 'yaµ ßabda˙ prayoktavyo 
'smiµs tåvac chabde 'yaµ tåvad varˆas tato 'yaµ tato 'yam iti/ 
 
The first sentence seems to mean: 
 
The sequence of sounds has the mind as its realm. 
 
A more satisfactory translation would of course be possible if we could look upon bud-
dhivi∑ayam as a Tatpuru∑a compound. We could then translate: 
 
The sequence of sounds is the object of the mind. 
 
I am not, however, aware of an instance where vi∑aya is a neuter word. The rest of the 
passage translates: 
                                                
42 On P. 1.4.109 vt. 10, Mbh I, p. 356, l. 5 f. 
43 See note 3, above. 




A man who thinks before he acts, sees: "In this meaning that word must be used, 
in this word first this sound, then that one, and then that one." 
 
S. D. Joshi, in the Introduction to his edition and translation of the Spho†anirˆaya 
(1967: 12), concludes from this passage that "the unity of words exists only in our 
mind". I fail to see how this conclusion can be drawn from the text. It rather states that 
the mind creates the sequence of sounds while pronouncing a word. This is confirmed 
by the last quarter of the preceding verse, which has: 
 
buddhau kuryåt paurvåparyam 
[The wise one] produces the sequence in his mind. 
 
The fact that the mind creates the sequence of sounds, does not imply that the real 
word, or the unity of words, exists only in the mind. A better interpretation would seem 
to be that the mind acts as an intermediary between the non-mental real word and the 
equally non-mental sounds. 
[50] 
 Similar criticism could be directed against Joshi's remark (1967: 10) that "by the 
term buddhinirgråhya˙ ‘grasped by the intellect’ (on ÍivasËtra 1 vt. 12) Patañjali 
indicates that word is a mental or psychical entity". Patañjali describes the word in the 
very same line as åkåßadeßa˙ ‘situated in ether’, which seems to prove that no mental 
entity can be meant.44 
 The mind is necessary if we assume that the collection (saµghåta) is a single 
entity without a sequence of sounds in it. The fact that the mind intervenes between the 
saµghåta and the sequence of sounds does not entail that this saµghåta is of a mental 
nature. Patañjali, at any rate, does not say anything of the kind.45 
 The kind of saµghåta which Patañjali seems to speak about can hardly be de-
scribed as a ‘collection’. If our interpretation up to this point is correct, it is rather an 
entity in its own right and no collection in the literal sense at all. The next question we 
have to turn to is whether or not Patañjali distinguished different types of verbal 
saµghåtas. 
 
                                                
44 I, p. 18, l. 19-20: ßrotropalabdhir buddhinirgråhya˙ prayogeˆåbhijvalita åkåßadeßa˙ ßabda[˙]. 
45 The V®ttikåra quoted in the Íåbara Bhå∑ya rejects the word as an existing entity, even though he 
accepts something mental, viz. saµskåra, as an intermediary between sounds and understanding 
(Frauwallner, 1968: 38-41). The entity rejected by the V®ttikåra appears to be similar to the one accepted 
by Patañjali. 
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4. Patañjali 's  padasaµghåta and varˆasaµghåta.  
 
 We find the two expressions padasaµghåta and varˆasaµghåta under P. 3.2.49 
vt. 3. The vårttika under which they occur reads: karmaˆi sami ca. It is explained by 
Patañjali in the following manner, correctly as it seems (II, p. 104, l. 2): 
 
karmaˆy upapade saµpËrvåd dhanter aˆ vaktavyo 'ntyasya †o vå vaktavya˙ 
When [a word denoting] the grammatical object is upapada, [the suffix] aÔ 
must be prescribed after the root han [51] preceded by sam; and † must be 
prescribed as optionally [taking the place] of the final [sound of han]. 
 
Patañjali then gives two examples: 
 
varˆasaµghå†a˙ varˆasaµghåta˙/ padasaµghå†a˙ padasaµghåta˙/ 
[This explains] varˆasaµghå†a [besides] varˆasaµghåta, padasaµghå†a 
[besides] padasaµghåta. 
 
The grammatical formation here given is peculiar, and has a direct bearing on the 
philosophical question we are investigating. Normally the word saµghåta is derived 
with the suffix GHaÑ in the sense bhåva by P. 3.3.18 (bhåve). This is actually done e.g. 
by Jinendrabuddhi in his Nyåsa on P. 7.3.32 (VI, p. 37) and by Bhånuji D¥k∑ita in his 
Råmåßram¥ on Amarako∑a 2.5.39 (p. 258-59). What is more, Patañjali himself uses the 
word saµghåta often as a separate word, not being part of a compound, and therefore 
without a word denoting the grammatical object as upapada. In all these cases the above 
derivation is not valid, so that Patañjali himself must have derived the uncompounded 
word differently, most probably with the suffix GHaÑ as well. Why then does he derive 
saµghåta differently in these two compounds? 
 One possible answer might be considered to lie in P. 2.2.14 karmaˆi ca. This 
rule forbids compound formation on the basis of an objective genitive; an example 
would be varˆånåµ saµghåta˙ and padånåµ saµghåta˙. However, the vårttikas and 
Bhå∑ya on P. 2.2.14 make clear that this prohibition is only valid where both object and 
subject are mentioned; it should not therefore prevent simple compounds like 
varˆasaµghåta˙ and padasaµghåta˙. 
 There is another reason to reject the view that Patañjali merely wants to secure 
the compounding of varˆånåµ saµghåta˙ and padånåµ saµghåta˙ in spite of P. 2.2.14. 
The result in that case would be simply varˆa- and pada-saµghåta. As it is, also the 
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forms varˆa- and pada-saµghå†a, with retroflex †, are derived.46 [52] We cannot but 
conclude that Patañjali here derives some special compounds in some special meanings. 
 Turning to the meaning we note that varˆa- and padasaµghåta are derived with 
the k®t-suffix aÔ. This suffix has the meaning ‘agent’ by P. 3.4.67 (kartari k®t). Derived 
with aÔ the words saµghåta and saµghå†a in, say, varˆasaµghåta / -saµghå†a mean 
therefore "what collects (sound / sounds)". Derived with GHaÑ, on the other hand, the 
compound varˆasaµghåta would mean "collection of sounds". The later grammarians 
agree with this distinction in meaning. The Kåßikå on P. 3.2.49, for example, explains 
the compounds derived with aÔ as follows (I, p. 221): varˆån saµhanti varˆasa∫ghå†a˙, 
varˆasa∫ghåta˙/ padåni saµhanti padasa∫ghå†a˙, padasa∫ghåta˙//. 
 What is the difference between "a collection of sounds / words" and "what col-
lects sound(s) / word(s)"? Laddu (1971: 316) proposes to understand the forms derived 
with aÔ as "one who collects the sounds, a phonetician" and "one who collects or codi-
fies words, a lexicographer" respectively. But he admits that no trace of such usage can 
be found in the surviving literature. 
 Another solution is possible. For Patañjali, as we have seen, a word is an entity 
in its own right, not just a collection of sounds; for him a word rather "collects sounds", 
or perhaps "joins a word together". We see that it is not yet clear whether a word is 
designated by the expression varˆasaµghåta or rather by padasaµghåta; we shall return 
to this question later. At this point it is important to understand that for Patañjali a word 
is no collection in the strict sense of the term, but rather a ‘collector’. 
 
5.  The Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 1.1.51 vt.  9.  
 
 We now have to study a passage in the Mahåbhå∑ya — the only one as far as I 
am aware — where one of these two terms is used. The expression padasaµghåta 
occurs here as part of a larger compound, which does not fail to evoke problems in its 
own right. The context is as follows. In the Bhå∑ya on P. 1.1.51 vt. 9 a discussion 
occurs in which the word nårkalpi figures. This word [53] is derived from n®kalpa with 
the suffix iÑ, by P. 4.1.95 (ata iñ). N®kalpa itself consists of the noun n® ‘man’ and the 
suffix kalpaP, prescribed by P. 5.3.67 (¥∑adasamåptau kalpabdeßyadeß¥yara˙). In the 
derivation of nårkalpi the ® in n® is replaced by å (P. 7.2.117 taddhite∑v acåm åde˙), 
which is then followed by r (P. 1.1.51 ur aˆ rapara˙). This results in 
 
 nå-r-kalpi. 
                                                
46 This is not the place to discuss the peculiar form saµghå†a. Note however that Burrow (1971: 550) 
proposes to see in saµghåta the non-cerebralized form of the root gha†. 




 The question is whether r is part of preceding nå or of following kalpi. If it is 
part of nå there is a difficulty. N® in n®kalpa is technically called a pada, by P. 1.4.17 
(svådi∑v asarvanåmasthåne). But then når in nårkalpi is a pada too. This would lead to 
the undesired consequence that r be replaced by a visarjan¥ya, by P. 8.3.15 
(kharavasånayor visarjan¥ya˙). 
 Can this problem be solved by stating that r is rather part of following kalpi? 
Patañjali says no. He explains (I, p. 129, l. 5-6): 
 
kalpipadasaµghåtabhakto 'sau notsahate 'vayavasya padåntatåµ vihantum iti 
k®två visarjan¥ya˙ pråpnoti/ 
 
The commentators agree in interpreting padasaµghåta here as pratyayasamudåya 
‘collection of suffixes’. This is understandable, for kalpi is the result of combining the 
two suffixes kalpaP and iÑ. This interpretation would justify the following translation: 
 
That [sound r, even though] part of the collection of suffixes kalpi, cannot do 
away with the fact that a portion [of this expression kalpi] is the final [sound] of 
a pada. As a result [substitution of ] visarjan¥ya would take place. 
 
Yet this interpretation of padasaµghåta is not acceptable, for various reasons. The first 
one is that pada means ‘word’, not ‘suffix’. In order to appreciate the second reason we 
must turn to a number of passages in the Mahåbhå∑ya where Patañjali uses closely 
similar words and phrases. We first take the Bhå∑ya on P. 1.1.47 vt. 7, which reads (I, 
p. 117, l. 1-2): 
 
saµghåtabhakto 'sau notsahate 'vayavasyegantatåµ vihantum 
[54] 
We notice the close similarity of this sentence with the earlier one. Here the addition of 
the augment nUM in the nom. nt. dual of such dvigu compounds as pañcåratnin¥ (from 
pañcåratni ‘five cubits’) is under discussion. The assumption has been made that nUM 
is part of what precedes it. Patañjali's statement here means: 
 
That [sound n, i.e., the augment nUM, though] part of the collection 
[pañcåratni-n], cannot do away with the fact that a part [of this collection, viz., 
pañcåratni] ends in a vowel [belonging to the pratyåhåra] iK. 
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The ‘collection’ here is the combination of the two parts that are relevant in the 
discussion, in this case of the part ending in i, pañcåratni, and of nUM. 
 Patañjali repeats the same sentence under P. 7.1.73 (I, p. 266, l. 5), where he 
makes the same point. Here the examples are pañcatrapuˆå and pañcatrapuˆa˙. Here 
too the augment nUM, though part of the collection pañcatrapu-n, cannot do away with 
the fact that the part pañcatrapu ends in an iK vowel. 
 The expression saµghåtabhakta is used at a few other occasions, always in the 
following phrase: 
 
asau (or: ayaµ) saµghåtabhakto na ßakya˙ (or: aßakya˙) X-grahaˆena grah¥tum 
 
X varies with the circumstances. At one place the phrase indicates that the prefix aÈ, 
though part of the collection (saµghåta), is not denoted by the term dhåtu ‘verbal 
root’.47 The infix mUK, similarly, in examples like pacamåna, is not part of what is 
denoted by he expression adupadeßa "what is taught as ending in a".48 Again, the prefix 
aÈ added to a verbal root belonging to the list gadådi, is part of the collection 
(saµghåta), yet is not covered by the term gadådi.49 
[55] 
 In all these cases Patañjali uses the term saµghåta to refer to the collection of 
the two parts that are relevant in the discussion. If we now return to the original passage 
which contains the compound kalpipadasaµghåtabhakta, we see that the interpretation 
of the commentators will not do. They think that saµghåta here refers to the collection 
of suffixes which constitutes kalpi, but that collection is not immediately relevant in the 
discussion. What is relevant is the collection r-kalpi, or, perhaps, nå-r-kalpi. The most 
natural interpretation of kalpipadasaµghåta in the circumstances seems to me: 
"collection of kalpi with [the preceding] pada". If we accept this interpretation, 
Patañjali's statement comes to mean: 
 
That [sound r, even though] part of the collection of kalpi with [the preceding] 
pada (i.e., nå-r-kalpi), cannot do away with the fact that a portion [of this 
collection, viz., the sound r] is the final [sound] of a pada. 
 
Of course, another interpretation is possible as well. One might urge that the collection 
under discussion is not nå-r-kalpi, but merely r-kalpi. Patañjali's kalpipadasaµghåta 
                                                
47 On P. 1.3.60 vt. 3 (I, p. 286, l. 1). 
48 On P. 6.1.186 vt. 3 (III, p. 112, l. 12); and on P. 7.2.82 vt. 1 and 3 (III, p. 303, l. 7-8 and l. 16-17). 
49 On P. 8.4.17 vt. 1 (III, p. 459, l. 7). 
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would then have to be interpreted as: "the padasaµghåta [which is] (r-)kalpi". This 
interpretation is open to the criticism that if Patañjali meant rkalpi, he might have said 
rkalpi rather than just kalpi. If, in spite of this criticism, this last interpretation is 
accepted, it must be concluded that padasaµghåta is here used in a peculiar sense. 
Kalpi, and rkalpi, is no pada in Påˆini's technical sense, but it can well be looked upon 
as a ‘word’ in some way. It is at least conceivable that Patañjali, knowing that the term 
pada would be inappropriate here, chose a term which he knew was used in non-
grammatical circles, a term which had not been narrowly defined like Påˆini's pada, 
viz., padasaµghåta. 
 In support of this interpretation one might adduce the fact that nårkalpi is not the 
only example which is discussed in this passage of the Mahåbhå∑ya. Other examples 
are nårku†a and nårpatya. The second halves of these examples are padas, so Patañjali's 
choice of a non-technical synonym of pada in order to [56] designate kalpi might be 
considered understandable. Note that this interpretation of Patañjali's use of 
padasaµghåta presupposes that padasaµghåta was in use primarily in non-grammatical 
circles, or at any rate had no technical grammatical meaning. It further makes only 
sense on the assumption that a padasaµghåta is not a "collection of words", say a 
sentence, but rather a single word conceived of as an indivisible entity. On this 
assumption varˆasaµghåta would refer to a single speech sound conceived of as a 
single undivided entity. 
 We must not conclude too much from this possible interpretation of Patañjali's 
use of kalpipadasaµghåtabhakta. This interpretation is far from certain, and, as we have 
seen, a more conventional interpretation is possible, in which padasaµghåta does not 
refer to a single concept at all. The question of the precise interpretation of 
padasaµghåta will however engage our attention once more towards the end of this 
lecture. 
 
6.  Comparable ideas outside grammar.  
 
 We have to turn to the question whether Patañjali's ideas stand isolated in early 
India. We have seen already that Patañjali makes several of his remarks in the context 
of some vårttikas. But all the points which allowed us to form a picture of Patañjali's 
ideas were new in the Mahåbhå∑ya; they were not, or not clearly, present in the 
vårttikas. It seems therefore reasonable to conclude that these ideas were not yet, or not 
yet fully, known to Kåtyåyana. 
 In Patañjali's ideas we can distinguish two separate aspects. For him words are 
(i) entities with an independent existence, (ii) which are, moreover, eternal. Some 
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authors, such as Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: xi, 114), concentrate on the second 
aspect, the eternality. They conclude that Patañjali attempts "to introduce the M¥måµså 
doctrine of the nityatva of the word". We have seen already that this position is 
chronologically not without difficulties, not to speak of the problem that in M¥måµså 
not the word as independent entity came to be looked upon as [57] eternal, but rather 
the sounds which constitute it. Joshi and Roodbergen do not discuss these difficulties, 
and we may conclude that the connection with M¥måµså is unlikely at best. 
 There is a passage in the Mahåbhå∑ya which seems to point in another direction. 
P. 1.2.45 vt. 11 reads: 
 
saµghåtårthavattvåc ceti ced d®∑†o hy atadarthena guˆena guˆino 'rthabhåva˙ 
And if [you say that individual sounds have meaning] because collections 
(saµghåta) have meaning, [the answer is no,] because subsidiary parts that do 
not serve a certain purpose are seen to constitute something that does serve that 
purpose. 
 
The Bhå∑ya explains the vårttika and then gives the following example (I, p. 220, l. 22-
24): 
 
yathå ... rathå∫gåni vih®tåni pratyekaµ vrajikriyåµ praty asamarthåni bhavanti 
tatsamudåyaß ca ratha˙ samartha evam e∑åµ varˆånåµ samudåyå arthavanto 
'vayavå anarthakå iti// 
For example, the parts of a chariot when taken apart are not each of them fit for 
movement; their combination (samudåya), i.e. the chariot, is fit [for that]. In the 
same way the combinations of these sounds have meaning [even though] the 
parts have not. 
 
This example does not add much to our understanding of the entities called saµghåta 
by Patañjali, but it suggests an interesting connection with another intellectual current 
in early India. Another text which, like the Mahåbhå∑ya, has been brought into 
connection with the realm of king Menander contains the same example. This text is the 
Milindapañha. 
 The Milindapañha is a semi-canonical text of the southern Buddhists which 
claims to reproduce a discussion between king Milinda — this is the Indian name for 
Menander — and the Buddhist monk Någasena. The oldest parts of this text can safely 
be [58] assumed to go back to a time not long after Menander, and must have been 
composed in the north-west of the Indian subcontinent. It is in the oldest parts that we 
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find the discussion which contains the same example of the chariot. It occurs in a very 
important passage of the Milindapañha, the passage namely where Milinda and 
Någasena meet for the first time. In the beginning of the second book (Lakkhaˆapañha) 
(p. 25 f.)50 king Milinda asks the monk Någasena his name. Någasena uses the 
opportunity to point out that ‘Någasena’ is but a conventional term, and that no person 
(puggala) can be observed (na h'ettha puggalo upalabbhati). In the ensuing discussion 
we learn that neither the hair, nor the nails, nor any of the other constituents of the body 
or their combination, none of the five Skandhas nor their combination, and also nothing 
outside the five Skandhas is Någasena. Then follows the simile. A chariot is neither the 
pole nor the axle, nor any of the other constituents or their combination, and also 
nothing outside them. 
 The simile of the chariot illustrates something which became a central issue 
among the Buddhists. The simile is found already in a canonical Buddhist SËtra (SN 
I.135), but the problem it illustrates becomes more central in the Buddhist Abhidharma 
works. Does the whole exist besides its parts? The Buddhists are unanimous in denying 
this. There is no whole besides the parts; no wholes exist at all.51 
 This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the dharma theory which came 
to occupy such an important place among the [59] Buddhists. It may be sufficient to 
state that the Buddhists came to accept a limited number of dharmas as the only really 
existing entities. Everything else, including everything composed of dharmas, did not 
exist in the ultimate sense. The dharmas were enumerated, the total number differing 
somewhat among the schools. Usually the number of dharmas in the later enumerations 
was not far removed from a hundred. Another, probably related, feature of many 
Buddhist schools was their claim that everything is momentary; that is to say, in the 
ultimate sense only momentary dharmas exist. (There are some exceptions, but it would 
take us too far to discuss them.) 
 The most important Abhidharma school of the Buddhists is known by the name 
Sarvåstivåda. Unfortunately but few of the works of this school have been preserved in 
Sanskrit, but many — including all their canonical Abhidharma texts — have survived 
in Chinese translation. The Sarvåstivåda school became characterized by the 
consequent manner in which they tried to think out the dharma theory, whatever the 
                                                
50 For a translation of this passage see, e.g., Rhys Davids, 1890: 40 f.; Frauwallner, 1956: 66 f.; Linne, 
1976: 122 f. This portion belongs to the oldest kernel of the Milindapañha since it occurs in the Chinese 
version: T. 1670, vol. 32, p. 696a, l. 9 f. For a translation of the Chinese version see Demiéville, 1925: 97 
f. The Chinese and Pali versions are compared in Thich Minh Chau, 1964: 47 f. 
51 Something similar is perhaps meant in the Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 6.1.1 vt. 13 (III, p. 3, l. 15-16): 
avayavåtmaka˙ samudåya˙/ abhyantaro hi samudåye 'vayava˙/ tad yathå/ v®k∑a˙ pracalan sahåvayavai˙ 
pracalati/. 
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result. The best known doctrine of this school is that all the three times — past, present, 
and future — exist (sarvam asti), but this was not even their most extreme doctrine. 
 
7.  The linguistic dharmas of the Sarvåstivådins.  
 
 In the present context we are most interested in the Sarvåstivåda ideas about 
words and language. The belief that only momentary dharmas really exist led to 
difficulties. It implied that words and sentences, and even individual sounds, do not 
really exist. 
 This was not to the liking of the Sarvåstivådins. They solved the problem by 
postulating the existence of some highly remarkable dharmas, called nåmakåya, 
padakåya and vyañjanakåya. These dharmas have been discussed by Padmanabh S. 
Jaini (1959), who expressed the opinion that they owe their origin to the influence of 
the theory of spho†a and of the M¥måµsaka theory of eternal words. This opinion is 
open to doubt. We [60] have seen already that the M¥måµså theory does not appear to 
be old. The relationship of the Sarvåstivåda linguistic dharmas to the grammatical 
tradition will be discussed in a while. Here it must be observed that the nåmakåya, 
padakåya and vyañjanakåya are already enumerated in the lists of so-called 
cittaviprayuka saµskåras in several canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvåstivådins: 
in the Dharmaskandha (T. 1537, vol. 26, p. 500c, l. 22, cf. p. 501b, l. 21), the 
Prakaraˆapåda (T. 1541, vol. 26, p. 628c, l. 23-24, p. 634c, l. 19-20; T. 1542, vol. 26, p. 
694a, l. 28-29, p. 699b, l. 23) and the Jñånaprasthåna (T. 1543, vol. 26, p. 774b, l. 5-15; 
T. 1544, vol. 26, p. 920b, l. 15-25). The first chapter of the Prakaraˆapåda is also 
known as a separate work called Pañcavastuka;52 here too we find the ‘linguistic 
dharmas’ enumerated and explained (T. 1556, vol. 28, p. 997c, l. 27-29; T. 1557, vol. 
28, p. 998c, l. 25, p. 1001a, l. 28-29; Imanishi, 1969: 8). They are of course a regular 
feature of later Sarvåstivåda and related works.53 
 The precise interpretation of the terms nåmakåya, padakåya and vyañjanakåya 
varies in the later texts. For our present purposes it is not necessary to study this in 
detail. One peculiarity of the later interpretations may however be noted: the word pada 
in padakåya has come to be interpreted to mean ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’. Stcherbatsky 
(1922: 24 n. 1) considered this "a case exhibiting clearly the desire to have a 
                                                
52 It is not impossible that the Pañcavastuka was an earlier work which was later incorporated into the 
Prakaraˆapåda. 
53 See, e.g., Gho∑aka's Am®tarasa (T. 1553, vol. 28, p. 979c, l. 13-14), Dharmaßr¥'s Abhidharmah®daya 
(T. 1550, vol. 28, p. 831a, l. 2-4), Upaßånta's Abhidharmah®daya (T. 1551, vol. 28, p. 866a, l. 14-17), 
Dharmatråta's Saµyuktåbhidharmah®daya (T. 1552, vol. 28, p. 943a, l. 25-28), Skandhila's 
Abhidharmåvatåra (T. 1554, vol. 28, p. 982a, l. 5, p. 987c, l. 23 - p. 988a, l. 11), Vasubandhu's 
Abhidharmakoßa and -bhå∑ya 2.47 (p. 80 f.; La Vallée Poussin, 1923-31: ch. II, p. 238 f.), etc. 
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terminology of its own". Jaini on the other hand thought that this unusual meaning of 
the term pada can be traced to Pali (p. 98 f.). He [61] supports this with an example 
from the Saµyutta Nikåya,54 which however does not carry much conviction; there is 
no reason to doubt that pada in this passage simply means ‘word’.55 
 There is no need to show that pada in Buddhism always meant ‘sentence’ or 
‘verse foot’; it did not always have that meaning in the compound padakåya. In the 
Prakaraˆapåda — the earliest text which explains the term padakåya — pada means 
‘word’. Padakåya is here explained as "a whole of speech sounds" (T. 1541, vol. 26, p. 
628c, l. 24; T. 1542, vol. 26, p. 694a, l. 28-29; T. 1556, vol. 28, p. 997c, l. 28). This 
interpretation of pada is more natural and therefore more satisfactory than ‘sentence’ or 
‘verse foot’. It leaves us however with the problem why this word acquired a different 
meaning later. One would be tempted to think that nåmakåya and padakåya were at one 
time synonymous. This, of course, would entail that there was a time when there were 
not three, but only two linguistic dharmas. 
 
8.  The original number of linguistic dharmas. 
 
 The conjecture that originally the Sarvåstivådins accepted only two linguistic 
dharmas tallies well with the fact that Patañjali's Mahåbhå∑ya enumerates but two 
linguistic entities, varˆasaµghåta and padasaµghåta. It is true that this latter fact should 
not be given too much weight, but it does give us some extra reason to seriously 
consider the possibility that the Sarvåstivådins originally had only two linguistic 
dharmas. 
 There is some evidence to support this. Before we turn to it, it will be necessary 
to say something about the Sarvåstivåda canonical Abhidharma texts. These texts, or at 
least some of them, have not been preserved in the forms in which they were written. 
The Dharmaskandha, for example, is rather the end-product of a development. 
Frauwallner (1964: 73-80; 1971: 103 f.) has adduced reasons to think that both the 
Sarvåstivåda [62] Dharmaskandha and the Pali Abhidhamma Vibha∫ga developed out 
of a common original text. The details of this development are not known to us, nor do 
we know when exactly this development came to an end. We only know that the end 
products of these two developments — the Dharmaskandha and the Vibha∫ga — differ 
greatly from each other. 
 In the case of the Dhåtukåya some insight into the history of the text is made 
possible by its relationship to the Pali Dhåtukathå on the one hand, and to the fact that 
                                                
54 SN II.36: ekena padena sabbo attho vutto. 
55 Viz., the word phassa which figures prominently in the preceding discussions. 
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this text, possibly in adjusted form, has been included in the fourth chapter of the 
Prakaraˆapåda on the other. Frauwallner (1964: 85 f.), who also studied this question , 
came to the conclusion that a part of the Dhåtukåya developed beyond the stage 
embodied in the fourth chapter of the Prakaraˆapåda, while another part is further 
developed in the fourth chapter of the Prakaraˆapåda. We see that adjustments and 
emendations were still added in the texts in relatively recent times. 
 The researches of Yukio Sakamoto (1935) take us to even more recent dates. 
Sakamoto compared the quotations from the Prakaraˆapåda in the Mahåvibhå∑å with 
the readings in the Prakaraˆapåda itself, and came to the conclusion that the 
Prakaraˆapåda still underwent changes after the compilation of the Mahåvibhå∑å! 
 It becomes clear from the above that most, perhaps all, of the Chinese 
translations of Abhidharma works which we possess are translations of emended, and 
therefore non-original, texts. In order to penetrate as far as possible to the earliest form 
of a certain idea, we must therefore not just use early texts, but where possible early 
translations as well. 
 The two Chinese translations of the Prakaraˆapåda which we possess were both 
made after the time when emendations were introduced into the text, and the same is 
true of one of the two Chinese translations of the Pañcavastuka, its separate first [63] 
chapter.56 The other translation of the Pañcavastuka, however, is old and may have been 
made by An Shih-kao, the first translator of whom we know. It may therefore date back 
to the second century C.E. What does this old translation tell us about the number of 
linguistic dharmas? 
 The oldest translation of the Pañcavastuka, which is probably the oldest transla-
tion we possess of any Abhidharma work into Chinese,57 knows only two linguistic 
dharmas!58 The clumsiness of this translation makes it hard to determine which two 
Sanskrit terms were here being translated. The first one reads in Chinese ming tzu, 
which may stand for nåmakåya or padakåya. I shall use the term padakåya for 
convenience' sake, not because I have any reason to think that this term rather than 
nåmakåya was used. The second term reads chüeh in Chinese, which literally means 
‘cut’ or ‘break’. This translation was apparently chosen to represent the constituent 
portions of a word, i.e., the vyañjana or rather the vyañjanakåya. 
 This same old translation of the Pañcavastuka explains the term vyañjanakåya 
with the words: tzu wei chü. This can be translated as "sound as a totality". This seems 
to indicate that vyañjanakåya was not considered a Tatpuru∑a compound but rather a 
                                                
56 For details see Imanishi, 1969: 4. 
57 So Demiéville, 1953: 446. 
58 See T. 1557, vol. 28, p. 1001a, l. 25 f. This conclusion was confirmed by Prof. E. Zürcher, in a private 
communication. 
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Karmadhåraya. We saw above that the old meaning of padakåya was, similarly, a 
collection of speech sounds, therefore ‘word’ rather than ‘collection of words’. We may 
conclude that vyañjanakåya and padakåya (or was it nåmakåya?) initially named single 
sounds and single words conceived of as single, indivisible entities. 
 
9.  The meaning of varˆa- and pada-saµghåta.  
 
 This conclusion may have an effect on the correct interpretation of the terms 
varˆasaµghåta and padasaµghåta. 
[64] 
 Let us focus our attention on varˆasaµghåta. According to Patañjali this term is 
to be analyzed as varˆaµ / varˆån saµhanti. What does this mean exactly? It might be 
understood in the sense that a varˆasaµghåta "collects sounds" and is therefore a 
collection of sounds. Another, equally plausible interpretation is that a varˆasaµghåta 
joins a sound together, unites all the constituent elements of a single sound so as to 
form one sound. A varˆasaµghåta is then a single sound. The term padasaµghåta can 
similarly denote a single word — conceived of as one indivisible entity — rather than a 
collection of words. This interpretation has the advantage that it agrees best with the 
original vyañjanakåya and padakåya of the Buddhists. 
 Interpreted in this way the two terms varˆasaµghåta and padasaµghåta 
correspond to the two entities which we know were familiar to Patañjali. The 
varˆasaµghåta would be the individual sound, conceived of as an independent entity, 
and possibly eternal; the padasaµghåta would be the word, also an independent entity, 
and also eternal. 
 
10.  The origin of linguistic philosophy. 
 
 The above discussion has taken it more or less for granted that Patañjali's varˆa- 
and pada-saµghåta on the one hand, and the vyañjana- and pada-kåya of the Buddhists 
on the other, are related entities. The similarities between these concepts leave, in my 
opinion, little room for doubt. But if they are related we must face the question who 
borrowed from whom. Chronological considerations do not give us an answer. Our 
present knowledge of the Buddhist canonical Abhidharma literature does not allow us 
to put a date to the introduction of the linguistic dharmas into their texts. And even the 
date of Patañjali is not fully beyond doubt, as we have seen. From a purely 
chronological point of view all we can say is that both options are still open: either 
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Patañjali antedates the introduction of the linguistic dharmas into the Buddhist 
scriptures, or vice versa. 
 But other considerations may yet be strong enough to reach very probable 
conclusions. It seems clear that Patañjali's ideas [65] about varˆasaµghåta and 
padasaµghåta cannot really be considered his own. They play no role whatever in his 
discussions and the terms are introduced as examples only. What is more, these ideas 
are the result of a concern for ontological questions which does not otherwise 
characterize Patañjali's discussions. Ontological questions form however the backbone 
of Buddhist Abhidharma. The lists of dharmas are lists of what there is. 
 The Buddhist dogmatists were equally interested in what is not there. All 
composite things and, of course, the human soul or person (pudgala) did not exist in the 
opinion of the most influential Buddhist sects. This ontological concern could not but 
confront the Buddhists with the question whether words and sounds exist. The 
momentariness of almost all dharmas allowed for no possibility that words and sounds, 
because they are extended in time, had any real existence. The Sarvåstivådins solved 
the problem by postulating that words and sounds really existed as separate dharmas, 
and this was an understandable response to a real and possibly pressing problem. It 
seems safe to conclude that Patañjali derived his ideas concerning the varˆa- and pada-
saµghåta from the Buddhists. This does not necessarily entail that the Buddhists knew 
the terms used by Patañjali — varˆasaµghåta and padasaµghåta. The possibility cannot 
be excluded that Patañjali did not borrow these ideas from the Buddhists directly, but 
rather through the intermediary of others. This might also explain the differences 
between the views of Patañjali and those of the Buddhists; especially noteworthy in this 
connection is the fact that for Patañjali the word is eternal, for the Buddhists 
momentary. 
 
11.  Change of terminology in Sarvåstivåda? 
 
 We may yet consider the alternative, and less likely, possibility that 
varˆasaµghåta and padasaµghåta were originally Buddhist terms. The Chinese 
expressions in the earliest translation are so vague that they may translate these two 
terms, or the more usual vyañjanakåya and padakåya; they do not allow of a decision. 
We have also seen that the canonical Abhidharma texts of the [66] Sarvåstivådins, or at 
least some of them, underwent changes in the course of their history. Could it be that 
these changes extended to individual terms? 
 The Chinese translation of the Pañcavastuka presumably made by An Shih-kao 
is our most important source in questions like this. At the same time it is so clumsy and 
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often unintelligible that we cannot hope to derive much elucidation from it. There is 
however one case which deserves mention. 
 The last dharma enumerated under the heading rËpa is normally called avijñapti 
in the surviving Sarvåstivåda texts. Avijñapti literally means ‘non-information’, and the 
term is used to designate a dharma which plays a role in connecting a deed with its 
result. At the position where we expect avijñapti in the Pañcavastuka, An Shih-kao's 
translation has the two Chinese characters pu keng (T. 1557, vol. 28, p. 998, l. 15). This 
means literally ‘non-change’ or something like it, and it is hard to see how this can be a 
rendering of avijñapti. However, another term was in use among at least some 
Buddhists, viz. avipraˆåßa. This term was used to designate something closely similar 
to avijñapti.59 The literal sense of avipraˆåßa is ‘non-perishing’, and it seems very likely 
that An Shih-kao found this term in the text he translated. 
 But avipraˆåßa is no Sarvåstivåda term. That is to say, it does not occur in the 
surviving Sarvåstivåda texts. Probably the oldest surviving text which uses the term is 
Någårjuna's MËlamadhyamakakårikå chapter 17. This chapter leaves no doubt 
regarding its general meaning. It is stated that the result of actions comes about on 
account of avipraˆåßa.60 Avipraˆåßa is furthermore characterized as a dharma taught by 
the Buddha.61 It remains however obscure exactly which Buddhists used this [67] term. 
The commentaries on the MËlamadhyamakakårikå do not help us much either. They 
ascribe the use of this term to ‘others’.62 This is also true of Vasubandhu's 
Karmasiddhiprakaraˆa.63 The term occurs once in the Mahåbhårata, where we read 
(crit. ed. 15.42.4): avipraˆåßa˙ sarve∑åµ karmaˆåm iti nißcaya˙. This seems to indicate 
that it was known to non-Buddhists too. 
 Lamotte attributes the use of avipraˆåßa to the Såµmit¥yas on the basis of a 
remark by K'uei-chi referred to by La Vallée Poussin (1928: 71). The 
Såµmit¥yanikåya-ßåstra — one of the few texts of this school that have been preserved, 
in Chinese translation — does indeed contain a passage which mentions the avipraˆåßa 
(T. 1649, vol. 32, p. 462a, l. 13-14).64 This does not however exclude the possibility 
that at an earlier time also the Sarvåstivådins used the term. It is in this context 
noteworthy that Någårjuna knows both the terms avijñapti and avipraˆåßa (see MMK 
17.4). This may imply that already in his time avijñapti had wholly or largely replaced 
avipraˆåßa among the Sarvåstivådins, so that he borrowed the idea of avipraˆåßa from 
                                                
59 For a further discussion of avijñapti and avipraˆåßa see Lamotte, 1936: 156 f., 162 f. 
60 MMK 17.15: tasmåd avipraˆåßena jåyate karmaˆåµ phalam. 
61 MMK 17.20: karmaˆo 'vipraˆåßaß ca dharmo buddhena deßita˙. 
62 See Lamotte, 1936: 230 n. 57; 1936a: 274 f.; 1958: 674 n. 43; cf. Prasannapadå (ed. La Vallée 
Poussin) p. 315, l. 12. 
63 Lamotte, 1936: 231. 
64 See Thich Thiên Châu, 1977: 253-54. 
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another school of Buddhists, perhaps from the Såµmit¥yas. Alternatively it may mean 
that within Sarvåstivåda there were different currents, one of which used avipraˆåßa, 
another avijñapti. 
 This second alternative seems to find support in the fact that Någårjuna knows 
only three saµsk®talak∑aˆas, instead of the usual four. They are specified in MMK 7.3 
as utpåda, sthiti and bha∫ga, while MMK 7.1 refers to them jointly as trilak∑aˆ¥. The 
surviving Sarvåstivåda texts enumerate four saµsk®talak∑aˆas: jåti, sthiti, jarå and 
anityatå. It would not be justified to draw conclusions from the differences in the way 
these dharmas are designated by Någårjuna and the surviving Sarvåstivåda texts; [68] 
Någårjuna was bound by the restraints of metre and may have chosen the terms 
accordingly. What is more, he refers to the second one, sthiti, using the different 
designation sthåna in MMK 7.34. The difference in number, on the other hand, may be 
significant. It is true that there were other schools of Buddhism which recognized only 
three saµsk®talak∑aˆas, and it was indeed usual to refer to a SËtra according to which 
there are three of them. This SËtra is referred to in this context in the Kathåvatthu 
(1.227; PTS ed. p. 61); and in the Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya (on verse 2.45; see La Vallée 
Poussin, 1923-31: I: 223 f.). It is however interpreted differently by the upholders of 
different views. Någårjuna's way of dealing with these lak∑aˆas creates the impression 
that he regards them as existing entities, as dharmas, and this seems typical for 
Sarvåstivåda. One might therefore tentatively conclude that Någårjuna knew a current 
within this school which accepted only three of these dharmas. An Shih-kao's 
translation of the Pañcavastuka, be it noted, has all four of them. 
 
12.  Patañjali 's  acquaintance with Buddhism. 
 
 The saµsk®talak∑aˆas take us back to the question  whether Patañjali, the author 
of the Mahåbhå∑ya, was directly acquainted with Buddhist doctrine. These lak∑aˆas are 
closely associated with the view that everything is momentary. Some passages in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya suggest that its author was acquainted with this point of view.65 On P. 
3.2.123 vt. 5 it is stated that according to ‘others’ the present time does not exist. This 
position is supported by a number of verses which are then quoted (II, p. 123, l. 24 - p. 
124, l. 9). By way of example the first one will here be reproduced: 
 
na vartate cakram i∑ur na påtyate 
 na syandante sarita˙ sågaråya/ 
kË†astho 'yaµ loko na vice∑†itåsti 
                                                
65 See Chakravarti, 1926: 491-92. 
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 yo hy evaµ paßyati so 'py anandha˙// 
[69] 
The wheel doesn't turn, nor is the arrow shot, 
 the rivers do not flow towards the ocean, 
the world's unchangeable, there is no mover; 
 one who sees this, he is not blind. 
 
Clearer is a passage on P. 4.1.3 (II, p. 198, l. 7-9): 
 
prav®tti˙ khalv api nityå/ na h¥ha kaßcit svasminn åtmani muhËrtam apy 
avati∑†hate/ vardhate vå yåvad anena vardhitavyam apåyena vå yujyate/ 
Activity is uninterrupted, for nothing in this world keeps its own identity even 
for a moment. Either it rises as long as it must rise, or it is destroyed. 
 
13.  Chronology of the pañcavastuka. 
 
 The evidence which we have considered so far supports the view that Patañjali 
borrowed his philosophical notions regarding the nature of the word from the 
Buddhists, most probably from the early Sarvåstivådins. This in its turn sheds some 
light on the chronology of certain developments in Abhidharma Buddhism. We had 
occasion to point out that the canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvåstivådins 
underwent changes until a late date. This makes the task of disentangling the old from 
the new in these texts particularly precarious. The occurrence of a certain dharma, or of 
a set of dharmas, in the Dharmaskandha — a text whose nucleus goes back to a period 
soon after the death of the Buddha — does not for that reason guarantee that that 
particular dharma or those particular dharmas are equally old. They may have been 
inserted into the text during one of its revisions. Questions of this type might be asked 
in particular about the linguistic dharmas discussed above: nåmakåya, padakåya and 
vyañjanakåya. If our above arguments are correct, we can answer such questions as 
follows: At least two of these linguistic dharmas figured already in the time of the 
Mahåbhå∑ya or even earlier, i.e., possibly in or before 150 B.C.E. 
[70] 
 These observations can be extended beyond the linguistic dharmas, to the so-
called pañcavastuka. This is the systematization of all dharmas in five categories named 
(i) rËpa, (ii) citta, (iii) caitasika, (iv) cittaviprayukta saµskåra, and (v) asaµsk®ta. This 
categorization of all dharmas represents a major step forward in the development of 
Abhidharma in that it embodies an  attempt to exhaustively collect and order all 
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elements of existence. Frauwallner (1963: 33-34) has rightly drawn attention to the 
importance of the appearance of the pañcavastuka in Abhidharma philosophy, and has 
compared this development with the systematizations of reality in Såµkhya and 
Vaiße∑ika. Frauwallner finds it hard to believe that among these three attempts at 
systematization the Buddhists were the first. He considers it far more likely that the 
pañcavastuka came into existence under the influence of the Hindu philosophical 
systems. He draws from this the chronological inference that the pañcavastuka arose 
around the beginning of our era, certainly not much before it. 
 The present study provides reasons to doubt Frauwallner's conclusions. The 
linguistic dharmas occur, in the surviving texts, always in the context of the 
pañcavastuka system of categories. This cannot by itself be considered proof that the 
linguistic dharmas were not already in existence before the pañcavastuka, but a closer 
inspection makes that rather unlikely. The fourth category of the pañcavastuka, viz., 
that of the cittaviprayukta saµskåras, contains many dharmas which cannot but be 
considered the outcome of an attempt to think problems out and solve them. The 
linguistic dharmas are striking examples. Like the pañcavastuka itself, they embody an 
attempt to bring order in the mass of dharmas inherited from earlier times. Both 
pañcavastuka and linguistic dharmas therefore seem to belong to the same period, and 
may indeed derive from one and the same person. The pañcavastuka, moreover, created 
in its fourth category a place for such unusual dharmas as the padakåya and the 
vyañjanakåya. If anything, the pañcavastuka may therefore be older than the linguistic 
dharmas. 
[71] 
 In view of the above it may be necessary to reconsider Frauwallner's dating of 
the origin of the pañcavastuka. Frauwallner's chronology was of course highly tentative, 
and our present reflections cannot claim to have given us indubitable certainty. Yet we 
now have some evidence, more evidence than Frauwallner could muster, that the 
breakthrough of traditional Abhidharma to some kind of systematic philosophizing took 
place around the time of Patañjali, or even earlier. In absolute dates, this may have been 
as early as 150 B.C.E. 
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14. Conclusions.  
 
 We have come to the end of this lecture, in which we have tried to pierce 
through the veil which covers the beginnings of linguistic philosophy in India. This veil 
is too thick for us to reach absolutely certain and clear results, but some increase of 
understanding may have been attained. Frauwallner still thought that the beginnings of 
linguistic philosophy had to be looked for somewhere in the development of Sanskrit 
grammar. He complained about the lack of materials for the period between Patañjali 
and Bhart®hari, and about the uselessness of the Mahåbhå∑ya. Subsequent scholars have 
pointed out that the Mahåbhå∑ya does contain some philosophical ideas about the 
nature of the word. The present lecture has tried to specify these ideas, and to trace 
them back even further. It has led to the remarkable conclusion that linguistic 
philosophy in India may be heavily indebted to Buddhism, from which it may have 
derived some of its ideas. An unexpected result of this investigation has been that the 
Mahåbhå∑ya may help us date certain early and important developments in Abhidharma 
Buddhism. It seems not unlikely that the first serious attempts to bring order in the 
inherited dharmas — which led to the system of categories called pañcavastuka, and to 
the postulation of a number of new dharmas, among them the padakåya and the 
vyañjanakåya — took place in a time preceding the date of the Mahåbhå∑ya, possibly 
before 150 B.C.E. 
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